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Abstract 
 
Municipalities in the U.S. are increasingly turning to private water management, 
often viewing it as a means to reduce costs. As has been the case in numerous developing 
countries, many domestic communities are now reacting to their local government’s plans 
to either sell its water system assets or contract out the system’s management. Guided by 
Snow and colleagues’ theory of frame alignment between individuals and social 
movements (1986) and Taylor’s analysis of environmental justice framing (2000), I 
identify several of the frames that residents have employed in U.S. cases of water 
privatization – including anti-privatization, right-to-water, and environmental justice. I 
then use a case-study method to investigate whether and how residents in Buffalo, New 
York expressed concerns regarding the city’s private water management contract between 
1996 and 2008 and employed these frames to do so. I provide brief summaries of two 
other private water management cases, in Milwaukee and in the Detroit area, to help 
illustrate how residents responded in comparable circumstances.  
In my results section, I lay out a historical narrative describing Buffalo’s 
discourse on water management over the course of three major phases. To investigate my 
observations in the historical analysis, I conducted a content analysis of the arguments for 
and against private water management quoted in over 200 local news articles during the 
period; I support my findings with data from that analysis. I find that the first phase was 
characterized by debate between public officials and public unions, the second phase was 
characterized by debate over a joint regional water system, and the third phase was 
characterized by attention to the concerns of residents, and in particular the concerns of 
low-income residents (e.g. high water rates, late payment policies, and home foreclosures 
related to water payments) in the press and among decision makers.  
I conclude that the concerns and arguments used in Buffalo aligned explicitly with 
a homeowners’/renters’ rights frame and implicitly with elements of both the right-to-
water and the environmental justice movements’ frames. I recommend a broadened 
understanding of both of these movements and their purviews, to include communities, 
like Buffalo’s, that voice related concerns, though they may not employ the explicit 
terminology. Finally, I make policy recommendations on municipal water management 
that relate to rate structures, decision-making processes, transparency, and accountability. 
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Local water management debates 
 “The marketplace makes you compete always.  Government departments like 
this [water department] operate as a monopoly, basically. They don’t really 
compete, so really there’s not incentive to improve. Especially if you’re a for-
profit company, you compete daily for profits.” – Mayor Gary Podesto, 
Stockton, California, in Thirst film (Snitow and Kaufman, 2004) 
 
“We don’t have to think about how are we going to make a profit here; all we 
have to think about is how we’re going to provide a good service to citizens.”  
– Michael McDonald, Stockton resident and sewage treatment plant supervisor, 
in Thirst film (Snitow and Kaufman, 2004) 
 
In cities across the country, water management is becoming a charged topic. The 
day that the city council of Stockton, California was to consider a private water 
management proposal, its mayor confidently applauded the motion’s imminent approval 
and told a group of supporters, “It’s time that Stockton enter the 21st century in its 
delivery of services and think of our citizens as customers.” As he spoke, protesters on 
motorboats were floating by outside the event site, waving handmade banners that read, 
“KEEP STOCKTON’S WATER PUBLIC” and chanting through megaphones, “Water for life, 
not for profit.”  
The grassroots effort, known as the Concerned Citizens Coalition of Stockton, 
that made itself known that pivotal day had been building for several months. A mostly 
middle-class cross-section of Stockton’s 270,000 residents, many of the group’s members 
would not have considered themselves activists, but felt strongly about engagement in 
local politics and, in particular, about having a voice in their city’s water management 
decisions. In the mayor’s second term, he was faced with new state environmental 
regulations that would require water infrastructure investments of well over $100 million 
and his proposed solution was to hand the system over to a private manager. From the 
idea’s outset in the fall of 2002, members of the Coalition wanted more information and a 
chance to discuss the decision further. They held that the mayor’s plan warranted at least 
a thorough public hearing and ideally a referendum. For months, their resounding request 
was “let us vote.” 
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The local alliance successfully put an initiative on the ballot to require a 
referendum on selling or contracting the city’s water in the future. In response, Mayor 
Podesto moved up the city council’s private management decision – to two weeks before 
citizens would vote on this initiative. Referring to the boating protestors, Mayor Podesto 
said, “they confuse this with this globalization issue” and also dismissed city residents’ 
ability to understand the proposed contract. The day of his speech, the proposed 
arrangement with OMI-Thames, a U.S.-British partnership, obtained the needed four of 
seven council votes. Both before and after the contract went into effect, residents 
continued to push forward with other policy tactics; they wanted to avoid the higher rates 
that they foresaw and to maintain the system’s accountability to the public. After four 
years of firm-run operations alongside ongoing community organizing, a judge required 
the city to return to public management of its water system in 2007, on the grounds that 
the mayor had skipped a mandatory environmental step in his zeal to pass the agreement. 
The arguments that each party used on Stockton come up again and again in water 
conversations worldwide. Increasingly, mayors are turning to private management as a 
vehicle for improved efficiency and to cover growing infrastructure costs. Community 
groups, also increasingly, are protesting with right-to-water and anti-privatization 
campaigns, like the Stockton coalition did. The term privatization covers a range of 
partnerships between government entities and companies, as well as the process and the 
global trend of transitioning from government operated provision of services to these 
partnerships. Water privatization, which can manifest in cities as sale of complete system 
ownership, sale of operations, or concessions for management, is on the rise in the 
context of these broader, global trends. At the root of this shift is the theory of 
neoliberalism and its applications.  
In the 1980s, neoliberalism garnered a sizable cadre of policy makers and global 
leaders who valued the role of the free market and advanced social and economic policies 
with low degrees of regulation. Emphasizing the inherent efficiency of the private sector, 
they promoted a move toward public-private partnerships for the delivery of public 
services – among these, electric utilities, public transportation, school meals, education, 
water, and wastewater. In the United States, the adoption of these arrangements between 
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private firms and municipal service provision continues at a rapid pace (Food & Water 
Watch, 2010). 
For those looking to improve efficiency and create market-based competition in 
government agencies, water management has proven to be a ripe opportunity. Local 
government backers of public-private drinking water deals see them as a chance for 
savings, short-term revenue, and long-term risk transfer; private companies see an 
undeveloped market, a global investment opportunity. For a municipality with a strapped 
budget and limited ability to issue bonds to secure loans needed to improve infrastructure, 
a private management contract that includes an upfront payment to the municipality and 
transfers all repair responsibility may look like a silver bullet. For other decision makers, 
like Mayor Podesto of Stockton, the choice is more ideological: private firms do it better. 
According to their argument, the costs of filtering and distributing water are high 
and increasing around the world and private enterprise presents the strategically optimal 
way to bring taps to everyone, no matter their wealth. Creating a market for water as a 
commodity, the argument posits, may be the only way to address the interrelated 
geophysical and social water-related challenges that the globe faces. 
The biggest group of stakeholders– the residents – has not always agreed with this 
reasoning. In many cities, residents have observed higher water rates and lower consumer 
responsiveness under private management (Food and Water Watch, 2010). Some 
residents have experienced heightened collections efforts, resulting in turned off water 
service or home foreclosure. Job standards, too, often change as public employees 
become private employees and unions dissolve overnight. In response, many have 
pressured their local leaders to improve their contracts and policies to include more 
equitable rate structures and less severe enforcement methods – or to return the operation 
and maintenance of the water system to public control. Objections to private water 
contracts can also be ideological; some residents of Stockton, for instance, objected to the 
idea of privatizing on the grounds that they wanted to exercise their right to vote on such 
a major change in public services and that a private company might threaten a 
fundamental human right: access to drinking water.  
Whether access to water is, indeed, a fundamental human right and whether 
owning and selling water infringes on this right are both open questions, hotly debated in 
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forums both global and local. Stockton’s residents were tapping into an international 
discourse on the right to water and the large-scale effects of privatizing it.  
Many believe that national governments and international institutions have an 
obligation to keep water services in the hands of communal or democratically elected 
bodies that are directly accountable to users. This, they contend, is the only way to ensure 
that all individuals will be able to access the amount of the resource that they need to 
survive. By the time Stockton was considering privatization in 2002, tens of thousands of 
protesters in Bolivia had captured the globe’s attention in 2000. Bolivian protesters took 
to the streets of Cochabamba to protest a World Bank-facilitated private water deal and 
they were met with violent law enforcement officers. Ultimately, the private contract was 
terminated. In Atlanta, a 20-year agreement with United Water had been terminated after 
only four years, when residents collectively complained of poor customer service and the 
issuance of too-frequent boil advisories. An international coalition against privatizing 
water systems – a water justice movement – emerged. 
With the availability of the world’s freshwater supplies decreasing and the 
uncertainty of climate change predicting further challenges, questions of who manages 
these resources are not minor. In the geographically and politically diverse United States, 
these difficult questions are playing out in myriad ways. Each region has its own struggle 
with managing water as a limited resource: agriculture in the Southeast, back-up systems 
to handle draught in the Southwest, and protection against overuse of the Great Lakes in 
Midwestern states. On top of state- and region-wide natural resource challenges, 
municipal governments in each of these places commonly face fiscal challenges. And for 
some, leasing or contracting their water systems to private management in exchange for a 
large payment at the outset looks like an attractive solution.  
In particular, cities near the Great Lakes, where increasing unemployment rates 
and decreasing tax revenues mark the loss of manufacturing, have encountered severe 
budget crises. In communities like these – with high poverty levels, small tax bases, and 
high regional inequality – environmental justice movements focusing on the equitable 
distribution of environmental hazards and toxin-free resources have been building at the 
neighborhood level since the early 1990s. This research was driven by an intent to 
understand 1) how Midwestern cities frame their desire to privatize their water systems 
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and 2) whether/how individuals and groups consider the privatization of their water 
systems through an environmental justice lens. Mayor Podesto in Stockton explained that 
his motivations concerned the private sector’s ability to increase efficiency and 
improvement. When Midwestern city governments, needing a solution for their fiscal 
conundrums turn to private water management, do they cite motivations, like Mayor 
Podesto did, of needing the market to drive competition and improvement? Has there 
been a water justice backlash from residents? Do existing environmental justice groups 
see water privatization as an issue of concern, or do environmental justice groups form to 
address issues of water access?  
This research employs a case-study approach to understand the concerns and issue 
framing that water privatization evoked in Buffalo, New York over a 12-year period. The 
policy discussions that began there in 1996 shed light on the above questions on water 
management decision making and the role of public participation. Less than three years 
after partnering with a private company, American Water, to manage its system in 1997, 
the mayor received an Outstanding Achievement Award from the U.S. Conference of 
Mayors. After eight years of contracting, the National Council for Public-Private 
Partnerships also lauded the City of Buffalo and American Water. But by 2008, with 
complaints from residents mounting, the city was seriously considering alternative 
options and, in 2010, it shifted to a contract with a new firm, on significantly altered 
terms. The engagement of policy makers, residents, and other stakeholders in the city’s 
decisions and the arguments they use throughout this time span reveal issues and 
concerns not only of relevance to Buffalo but to the broader global conversation on 
water. 
This thesis’ five chapters explore these issues and concerns.  In Chapter 2, I 
summarize the literature and provide background on water resources, municipal water 
management, the water industry, environmental justice, and the water access and water 
justice movement. I also provide brief summaries of two other private water management 
cases in the U.S. These cases, in Milwaukee and in the Detroit area, help illustrate how 
different debates played out in comparable communities, creating a baseline for 
understanding the issues and framing that emerged in Buffalo. In Chapter 3, I set the 
stage for the water management conversations in Buffalo through a thumbnail history of 
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the city and its water system. In this chapter, I also elaborate on my research questions 
and methodology. In the fourth chapter, I lay out my findings, as a historical narrative 
describing Buffalo’s discourse, including supporting data from a content analysis of over 
200 local news articles. The final chapter recaps and synthesizes the issues and concerns 
visible from my historical and content analyses. I conclude by explaining how this case 
study informs the larger environmental justice concerns around water and wastewater 





Drinking Water, Private Management, and Environmental Justice 
 
“If you don’t pay your water bill, they can put a lien on your home. Then they 
take your house. Then they got another house to get rid of because nobody’s 
buying houses in the city of Detroit.” – Detroit resident (Truth Commission, 
2008) 
 
 “Somebody has to pay for water, ladies and gentlemen. Whether it’s the users 
or the future generations, that is the reality.” – Woicke, World Bank, at the 
2003 World Water Forum, in Thirst film (Snitow and Kaufman, 2004) 
 
In this chapter, I summarize the literature and provide background on water 
resources, municipal water management, and the water industry. I also describe 
environmental justice and the movement for water access and water justice, 
understanding them as two types of responses to water privatization. I then provide brief 
summaries of two other private water management cases in the U.S. The cases of 
Highland Park, Michigan and Milwaukee illustrate how debates over water privatization 
have played out in particular communities, providing a point of comparison for Buffalo’s 
issue framing and expressed concerns. The frames that residents and advocates in these 
two cases employed are examples of the response options that Buffalo residents had. I 
measure the appearance of these and other frames in my analysis of the actual responses 
to water privatization in Buffalo (in Chapter 4). 
 
Water 
Living in a closed global system, our water resources are finite. The total amount 
of water circulating around the earth in various forms – from rivers to snow to people – is 
and will remain constant. Yet contemporary non-fiction writing increasingly asserts the 
scarcity of water, our diminishing global supply, and the increasing presence of drought. 
There are two ways that water is “used up”: contamination and local supply 
depletion. When communities withdraw water in sustainable amounts and return it in a 
usable form, the reduction in supply, if there is any, is very small. If the withdrawn water 
becomes polluted during use, however, then the amount of potable freshwater decreases. 
Of the total amount of water in our fixed global system (about 1.4 billion km3), 97.6% is 
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undrinkable ocean water and about 70% of the remaining freshwater is trapped in the 
form of glaciers. Only about 0.1% of the globe’s seemingly abundant resource of water is 
liquid, potable, and accessible to people. 
The manner and rate at which water is withdrawn is also an important factor 
determining water supply. As surface water in lakes and rivers becomes polluted and 
depleted by use, many regions are turning to groundwater, which lies in soil and rock 
gaps below the ground’s surface. When this aquifer “mining” is conducted at intensive 
rates, it essentially does not allow for recharging within a human timeframe. The aquifer 
running from Texas to North Dakota, for instance, has been pumped to the degree that it 
will require thousands of years to recharge. Sufficient withdrawal can even lead to 
aquifer collapse, causing the ground surface to sink over time, and rendering the aquifer 
compressed and completely unable to recharge. In effect, groundwater is a non-
replenishable resource. 
Regional water shortages are the result of a combination of population increases, 
water usage, climate, and political factors. Barlow (2007), in her book Blue Covenant, 
contends that water shortage is caused by surface water pollution, groundwater depletion, 
urbanization, deforestation, climate change, dams and diversions, and institutional 
decision making. All of these factors contribute to the presence and sufficient supply of 
freshwater in a given geopolitical region. 
The UN defines water scarcity “as the point at which the aggregate impact of all 
users impinges on the supply or quality of water under prevailing institutional 
arrangements to the extent that the demand by all sectors, including the environment, 
cannot be satisfied fully” (2007). Many researchers use a metric relating water supplies to 
population: a region is experiencing water stress if annual water supplies are below 1,700 
m3 per person and a region is experiencing water scarcity if they are below 1,000 m3 per 
person. The UN estimates that 700 million people in over 40 countries currently 
experience water scarcity, and that by 2025 this number will grow by more than 250%. 
Wealthier and more industrialized countries tend to use more water per capita per 
day; for example, Americans use an average of about 575 liters of water per person per 
day while residents of Cambodia, Uganda, and Haiti each use under 20 liters on average 
(UN Development Programme, 2006).  Globally, about 69% of water withdrawal is for 
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agriculture, 25% is for industry, and 6% is for domestic use, including drinking, cooking, 
and washing (Cunningham and Cunningham). This distribution varies greatly across 
higher-income, more industrialized countries and lower-income, less industrialized 
countries. In India, for instance, 93% of water withdrawal is for agricultural use, while in 
many European countries, 70% is for industry. Significant amounts of water are lost in 
irrigation systems, through evaporation and seepage; alternate irrigation methods tend to 
be either very energy intensive or expensive to implement. 
While water scarcity does not exist in the United States the way it does in 
developing countries, many communities are starting to experience water shortages, 
necessitating modifications either in use or in sourcing. Several states including Florida, 
California, New Mexico, and Arizona are all depleting their freshwater reserves. In 2008, 
the EPA estimated that, given current usage rates, 36 states would – either locally, 
regionally, or statewide – experience water shortages within five years (2008).  
Within industrialized nations, access to water is also more nuanced than 
geography and national wealth. At the hyperlocal neighborhood and household levels, 
access is also a product of local governance, class, and political power. While, in 
aggregate, the U.S. is relatively wealthy and has higher degrees of water access, many 
families on an individual basis find themselves in political and financial contexts in 
which they cannot always afford to pay for basic needs, including water use. It is this 
level of access that I explore in this paper. 
 
Municipal water management 
 For centuries, communities and their local governance structures have coordinated 
systems for water usage. The desired outcomes in designing these systems have included 
– in various contexts – safety, efficiency, sustainability of local resources, ecosystem 
protection, accountability, transparency, equitable distribution, profit, and maintenance of 
existing power and socioeconomic structures. (See for examples Ostrom, 1990, p. 69-88.) 
Generally, water rights in English-based common law systems have been either 
governed by the principle of riparian rights or the principle of prior appropriation. 
Riparian, or land-based, rights allow landowners adjacent to a body of water “reasonable 
use” of the water, usually proportional to the extent of their property on the waterfront. 
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Prior-appropriation rights – also known as prior tempore, potior jure or first in time, first 
in right – indicate that the first person to put a given source of water to “beneficial use” 
has the right to continue using the same amount indefinitely and can transfer this 
usufructuary right to another person, while all others may use the water only insofar as it 
does not impinge on the initial individual’s use. In U.S. law, this latter system tends to 
apply in Western states, while land-based rights generally hold in Eastern states.   
 In the 19th and 20th centuries, industrialized countries developed local water and 
sanitation systems that were largely operated by public institutions.  (France was the main 
exception to this, fostering private-run water operations as early as the 1800s.) Currently, 
all U.S. residents have geographic access to safe drinking water and nearly as many 
receive it from public water systems, defined by the EPA as systems serving at least 25 
people (public in this context refers to the recipients, not ownership or management). The 
country has 54,000 drinking water systems. Those owned by a local government serve 
about 85% of residents; private systems serve the remainder (Levin et al., 2002).  
From the late 1970s through the 1990s, local authorities in industrialized countries 
made significant shifts from public to private operations of former government functions 
– in areas from utilities and water to school buses and social services. One aggregation of 
U.S. data from 1988 and 1997, shows that the rate of contract use by local governments 
increased in 12 different service categories, with half increasing by more than 20 
percentage points. The portion of governments using contracts for gas operations or 
management rose from 12% to 60%, for instance, and for electricity it rose from 11% to 
43% (Cooke, 2008). In 1989, Margaret Thatcher led the United Kingdom’s complete sale 
of its ten public water and wastewater systems. Water system sales and concessions have 
begun to ramp up in the U.S. more recently, currently representing an estimated 15% of 
the country’s systems, with predicted growth in coming years (Food and Water Watch, 
2010). 
Privatization is a broad term that can cover a wide variety of scenarios. Table 2-1, 
adapted from Cooke (2008), shows the types of service privatization that municipalities 
tend to use in the U.S. Contracting out is the most common form of local service 
privatization. Importantly, where a private entity plays a role in any of these local public-
private arrangements, the institution may be either for-profit or non-profit. In the framing 
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of the right-to-water discourse, ‘privatization’ is used to connote many different 
meanings; often, anti-privatization activists are referring primarily to asset sales and 
contracts with for-profit companies.  
 
Table 2-1. Forms of municipal privatization (adapted from Cooke, 2008) 
Form Description: The municipal government’s action 
Asset sale Sells a property or enterprise 
Long-term lease Sells a property or enterprise and leases it back 
Contracting out Contracts with a private (for-profit or non-profit) entity to 
manage and/or provide a good/service 
Public-private 
partnership 
Manages together with a private sector to provide a good/service, 
sharing financing and risk 




Encourages the provision of a good/service by the private sector 
or individuals, e.g. through zoning or rent-free office space 
Internal market Encourages agencies to purchase goods/services either internally 
or externally, according to a cost-benefit analysis (encouraging 
competition) 
Managed competition Provides a good/service, while also competing with a contractor 
providing the same good/service 
Vouchers Distributes vouchers that can be used to purchase a good/service 
in a specified way 
Self-help Encourages individuals and groups to provide a good/service 
rather than providing it directly 
Volunteerism Relies on individual volunteering to provide a good/service (e.g. 
fire departments) 
 
Donahue (1989) shows that the trends towards private-run public services in the 
1980s were different in the U.S. than in other industrialized countries in part because the 
U.S. simply had fewer publicly owned and operated functions than its counterparts. (In 
the late 1970s, about 6.7% of the labor force in most industrialized nations worked for 
state enterprises, compared to 1.5% in the U.S.)  While in many places privatization 
referred to asset sales – e.g. of telecommunications, railway, power production systems – 
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in the U.S. “it meant (and continues to mean) enlisting private energies to improve the 
performance of tasks that would remain in some sense public” (Donahue, 1989). Though 
not identical to related privatization trends around the world, the shift towards privately 
managed or operated public services in the U.S. is clearly measurable. 
The ways in which municipalities have sold or contracted their water management 
can be grouped under three general categories: sales of services, of assets, and of water 
itself. Under a sale of services scenario, the public authority maintains ownership of both 
the water and the means of distribution, solely contracting out the function of providing 
water to residents. If both assets and services are sold, the company also has ownership of 
all of the equipment related to these services, including pumping plants, treatment 
facilities, office buildings, delivery systems, and pipes. Finally, some communities in 
developing countries have sold the rights to their water as well, meaning that the 
company alone has the authority to make all decisions relating to its use and distribution 
(Glennon, 2005). 
Water-related services in the world’s non-industrialized countries were, of course, 
slower to develop.  By the 1980s, the urbanization of developing countries combined 
with the pollution of their surface water had led to an increased need for drinking water 
and sanitation infrastructure. During that decade, a set of ideologies and policies 
collectively labeled neoliberalism was gaining momentum around the world.  A shift was 
taking place – both ideological and practiced – towards neoliberalism and pro-market 
policies in Margaret Thatcher’s Britain and Ronald Reagan’s U.S. In international 
development policy and practice, these trends took the form of the so-called Washington 
Consensus, which reflected an informal agreement among the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund, and U.S. foreign policy leaders to prioritize the expansion 
of private markets, the liberalization of trade, and deregulation in developing countries 
(Harvey, 2005). 
Historically, the chief proponent of pursuing this type of shift as comprehensively 
as possible was the economist Milton Friedman. His theories took the free-market system 
to its logical extreme; these theories developed a set of predicted dynamics and outcomes 
all based on a theoretical world in which free markets operate perfectly. In order to 
achieve – or approximate – this ideal laissez-faire arrangement, Friedman and his 
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followers actively encouraged leaders to take a three-pronged approach to policy 
changes: cut social spending, privatize services previously provided by the state, and 
deregulate markets. At first, these ideas were touted primarily among academics, rooted 
in University of Chicago-based circles and later at Argentinean and other international 
universities. Eventually they began to take hold in practice, guiding policies at the 
national level – in places as varied as Chile and England – as well as at the municipal 
level (Klein, 2007; Harvey, 2005). 
Citing sociologist Goldman, Barlow makes the case that the World Bank, the 
wealthy nations that governed it, and a set of water companies collectively 
“manufactured consent” that private services were the most efficient – and, according to 
some framing, altruistic – option for bringing needed water services to developing 
countries (2007). In a 2006 report put out by Public Services International and the World 
Development Institute, Hall and Lobina poked substantial holes in the World Bank’s 
central principles of water privatization, concluding that “it is clear that the emphasis on 
the private sector over the past 15 years has had a negative impact on progress towards 
the water and sanitation [UN Millennium Development Goal] with major implications for 
communities of poor people around the world.” The same year, a UN report highlighted 
water companies’ practice of terminating unprofitable contracts with developing 
communities, and its highly detrimental social and health consequences. 
Related framing that focuses on improved efficiency and competition is evident in 
the U.S. and other industrialized nations. As cities experienced heightened fiscal stress in 
the 1970s and 1980s, the prevailing wisdom was to save money by selling or contracting 
out services. Donohue identifies two components of public/private decisions: 1) 
financing, whether individual or collective (i.e. through taxes), and 2) delivery, whether 
public sector or private sector. In making public/private management decisions, it is 
important for officials and voters to examine both efficiency and accountability factors. 
Donohue defines the broad umbrella of accountability as “fidelity to the public’s values, 
whatever they may be” (1989, p. 9-12). 
A series of policies in the U.S. has fostered the growth of municipal outsourcing 
of services. In the early 1980s, a collection of statutes providing tax incentives for private 
management and investment in utilities helped to build the appeal of local partnerships. 
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These tax incentives dwindled with the 1986 Tax Reform Act, but in 1994 President 
Clinton explicitly promoted local public-private partnerships in his Executive Order on 
national infrastructure investment. A pivotal change to the tax code in 1997 allowed local 
governments and agencies to create contracts up to 20 years in length, rather than only 
five years, opening the door to longer-term propositions that had much more draw for 
investors (State Environmental Resource Center, 2004). Simultaneously, indirect policy 
and regulatory factors lured overseas firms to the U.S. market. The 1986 and 1996 
amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act presented many municipalities with 
financing gaps that they would need to fill over time in order to meet new standards. The 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) substantiated the scale of this investment need 
with nationwide, multi-billion dollar estimates; in 2002, the EPA estimate for total 
drinking water capital costs for the following 20 years reached $102 billion, with billions 
more needed for wastewater systems. In particular, regulations promoting or requiring 
wastewater system upgrades, to avoid raw sewage overflow during storms, have 
increased the opportunities for firms to engage with municipalities on their infrastructure 
and management needs. 
Privatizing water in industrialized countries has, by some measures, saved local 
governments’ costs. Sclar shows, however, how budgets can be deceptive (2001). In 
many cases, total savings under privatization have been lower than government estimates, 
because of incomplete accounting of continued private firm oversight. Other studies have 
revealed a partial assessment of assumed and transferred risks in cities’ cost-benefit 
analyses (Wolff, 2003; Wolff and Hallstein, 2005). The assessment of these types of 
contracts and their savings potential for cities is an inexact science, with substantial room 
for honing. 
Private management of government services, in general – and of water delivery, in 
particular – has also led to declines in social and economic measures, in a number of 
documented cases.  Many of these measures are also not incorporated in the 
municipality’s proposal analyses. Analysis of the United Kingdom in the 1980s has 
shown that shifts to private management of public services caused the layoffs of 
thousands of worker, wage drops, skyrocketing water rates, and water shut-offs for 
millions of residents who were behind on bill payments (Barlow, 2007; Bakker, 2005). In 
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the U.S., fewer cases have been adequately documented, but some research, anecdotal 
evidence, and community organizing – as I will show – have also revealed the challenges 
that private management can present to communities. 
 
Water industry 
Starting in the 1990s, governmental and lending policies began to change to 
support private water investment, particularly in the United States. Simultaneously, the 
trends of major infrastructure needs, increasing strain on water resource supplies, and 
population growth were pushing system operators to conjure up new, high-capital 
management solutions. With these combined drivers, the industry of buying, selling, and 
leasing water systems boomed. The major multinational companies – led by Vivendi 
Universal, Suez Lyonnaise des Eux, Enron, Bechtel, RWE, and others – began to 
consolidate the world’s smaller water systems, through purchases and leases of local 
systems.  
From 1994 to 1998, a handful of companies took part in an unprecedented 139 
water and wastewater industry mergers and acquisitions, for a total value of $4 billion. 
Then, in 1999, Enron bought Wessex Water in the United Kingdom for $2.2 billion, 
Vivendi purchased U.S. Filter in the western United States for $6.2 billion, and Suez 
acquired United Water Resources in the northeastern U.S. for $1 billion; RWE-owned 
Thames Water bought American Water Works in 2001 for $4.6 billion and took on about 
$3 billion in debt. At the same time, online trading of water rights and contracts was 
burgeoning. In 2000, the entire industry brought in an estimated $800 billion in revenue 
globally; it continued to grow in the following years (Rothfeder, 2001). 
By 2007, Suez, Veolia (having separated from Vivendi), and RWE dominated the 
U.S. market. After American Water split from RWE in 2008, American moved up to the 
top of that list. In 2010, New Jersey-based American Water served 16 million people in 
35 states and two Canadian provinces and made $2.4 billion in revenue. United Water, 
also housed in New Jersey, is run by Paris-based Suez; it serves 7.3 million people in 21 
states, owning 25 water and sewage systems and partnering with local governments on 
145 others. The multinational Suez Environment’s sales revenue was over $19.2 billion 
in 2010. By 2003, Suez had received substantial bad press in North America due to its 
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failure to maintain Atlanta’s water and sewage systems to acceptable standards and, in 
2007, it lost its largest U.S. client, Milwaukee. The third company, Veolia Water North 
America serves 14 million people in 32 states. Its French parent company, Veolia 
Environment reported $49.8 billion in revenues in 2009. Even as these three companies 
are facing civic resistance in many of the municipalities with which they negotiate, they 
are continuing to expand their presence in the U.S. (Food and Water Watch, 2011). 
The leading multinational companies fueled their rapid, transatlantic growth 
beginning in the mid 1990s via several core methods. Often, they bought local or regional 
companies in one streamlined deal. In other cases, they have purchased an influential 
portion of a smaller company’s shares and shifted toward complete ownership over time. 
Finally, many have worked to convince local U.S. officials with publicly run water 
systems to partner with a private firm, either through a sale or a concession, and then 
submitted for the deal in a joint proposal with a local firm (Barlow and Clarke, 2002). In 
some cases, they have chosen to take on deals that appear to be financially detrimental 
decisions, with an eye on the larger market. A Suez executive, quoted by Snitow and 
Kaufman, explained that the company and its competitors had made extraordinarily low 
bids on early U.S. water contracts, like that of Atlanta’s, in an attempt to gain a foothold 
in the North American market even at a loss in the near term (2007). 
Efforts to create a private market in communities where government services 
currently suffice are labor intensive and costly, and the leading European water 
companies devoted a significant amount of resources to them in 1990s and 2000s. 
According to a study by The Center for Public Integrity, the water industry, its 
employees, and its political action committees made about $1.5 million in U.S. campaign 
contributions between 1999 and 2002, up from less than half a million during the prior 
three years (2003).  
There are also a range of mechanisms and institutions through which the industry 
has been able to influence public officials in the U.S., including the National Association 
of Water Companies and its lobbying arm and the Urban Water Council of the U.S. 
Conference of Mayors. Globally, water company heads, international finance chiefs, 
country leaders, and some United Nations representatives have been coming together 
through the World Water Council’s forums and other international meetings to 
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collaborate on building and expanding a water market, particularly in regions with water 
scarcity and stress.  
 
Environmental justice: Access to natural resources and social movement framing 
 The archetypal environmental justice dispute arises in response to the siting of a 
noxious facility near a community that is low-income and/or composed predominately of 
people of color. Whether the setting is urban, suburban, rural, or reservation, these 
vulnerable communities tend to have insufficient social services – from law enforcement 
to education to direct health care. Most likely, the community has already been 
overburdened with harmful environmental factors prior to the siting. In hundreds of 
cases, a local movement has arisen from circumstances like these, struggling through 
various legal and political pathways to promote a healthy and livable environment for the 
local community. 
 The tenets of the wider environmental justice movement hold, more broadly, “the 
right to ethical, balanced and responsible uses of land and renewable resources” 
(Principles of Environmental Justice, quoted in Bryant, 2004; see also Bullard, 1990; 
Cole and Foster, 2000). This includes access to clean air and water, open space and parks, 
healthy food, affordable and safe transportation, and affordable and healthy housing.  In 
the type of siting case described above, community members attempt to improve or 
defend the quality of a particular resource (often air or soil) in a particular location.  From 
this vantage point, however, there is little they are able to do to change the overall 
patterns of “balanced” resource use, distribution, or access. 
 Researchers, too, often focus on these isolated siting cases; even aggregate studies 
tend to analyze collections of particular “locally unwanted land use” (LULU) siting 
instances. Pulido (2000) has examined environmental racism as an outcome of historical 
processes – the movement of racial and ethnic groups within an urban region – using the 
lens of white privilege.  She criticizes many environmental justice writers, particularly 
their “[analyses of] siting, as a discrete and conscious act... solely with respect to the 
locations of racially subordinated groups without sufficient attention to the larger 
sociospatial processes that produced such patterns” and calls particular studies “attempts 
to analytically sever racism from larger social processes (such as housing markets)” (17-
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18).  In addition to often taking place in a theoretical and historical vacuum, these 
discussions are generally limited to the presence of environmental “bads” and they less 
frequently examine access to “goods,” like parks or drinking water. 
 A second strong value of the collective environmental justice movement is the 
right to community-based decision making.  One of the 17 environmental justice 
principles agreed upon in 1991 “affirms the fundamental right to political, economic, 
cultural and environmental self-determination of all peoples.”  Activists and researchers 
have captured a similar idea with the affirming statement, “We speak for ourselves.” In 
their report on Katrina, “In the Wake of the Storm,” Pastor and colleagues describe the 
movement’s “heavy emphasis on community participation, neighborhood autonomy, and 
democratic decision making” (2006). 
 Grassroots environmental justice movements that frame resource issues in terms 
of access are more common in developing countries than developed countries for several 
reasons. In industrialized countries, the primary environmental hazard has been gaseous, 
toxic emissions, such as dioxin or lead compounds. People can often see these pollutants 
and feel their effects; thousands have organized and responded.  But because access to air 
is universal, one rarely hears it mentioned among these movements. An organization 
might employ framing such as “the right to clean air,” but overall, access receives much 
less attention than quality. In contrast, the conversation in developing countries – both at 
the grassroots level and in research – repeatedly turns to access and barriers to it, rather 
than quality. 
 In the U.S., the environmental justice movement has encompassed a range of 
environmental quality issues, in addition to air quality, but few of these have led to access 
framing.  Siting issues, for instance, include land-based hazards, like Superfund sites.  
Movements arise to restrict the siting of these environmental “bads” and to improve the 
surrounding land and water quality.  With the exception of Pulido’s work, however, these 
cases are not likely to discuss access to, or the privilege to live on, hazard-free land.  
Instead, they examine the proximity to or degree of environmental degradation. 
 Repeatedly throughout U.S. history, American Indian movements have addressed 
their rights of access to environmental resources – land, water, materials – and the 
decisions surrounding their management.  More recently other members of the 
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environmental justice community have adopted a similar framing for issues in cities: 
access to healthy food, drinking water, and open space. Advocates and residents in many 
densely populated urban neighborhoods began to coordinate a concerted effort to 
improve access to park and recreational space around the turn of the century. This type of 
land use campaign in and on behalf of low-income communities has deep roots in the 
environmental movement (Taylor, 2000). 
 Access in these cases refers not only to presence and proximity, but also to access 
to a means of transportation to reach a good, affordability, information, social and 
political connectedness, and political power. Access framing and improvements can be a 
vehicle for broader and deeper improvements addressing this spectrum of factors of 
social vulnerability.  
 Outside of these examples, framing that emphasizes access to natural resources is 
rare in industrialized country cases.  While some organizations and individuals do 
identify water as such an issue, there are extremely few instances of popular media 
employing these terms.  Overall, a review of existing literature on water management in 
North American communities shows a lack of a coherent framework for understanding 
the “right to water” in terms of environmental justice and access.  
 In an article on the environmental justice paradigm, Taylor shows how the 
environmental justice lens is a frame, in Goffman’s sense of frames as “schemata for 
interpretation” that allow a “user to locate, perceive, identify, and label” occurrences 
(1974). Utilizing work by Snow and colleagues on the roles of frame alignment and 
frame bridging in social movements and action (1986), Taylor goes on to show that this 
environmental justice frame has been used, modified, and extended by social movements 
in various contexts (2000). Indeed, over the two decades since its first convenings in the 
early 1990s, the national environmental justice movement and its messages have 
expanded and morphed significantly, to encompass an ever-growing range of issues and 
local cases, beyond the placement of hazardous sites. 
As a framework for understanding and responding to individual and communal 
experiences, the environmental justice frame sometimes serves as an explicit and 
powerful frame, or elaborated master frame, and it other times is an implicit frame, not 
completely bridged to the master frame, or a submerged frame. Taylor explains that an 
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elaborated master frame “provide[s] the interpretive medium through which activists 
identify problems and assign blame or causality” in a way that is relatively accessible and 
malleable, evolving with the experiences of various aggrieved groups. In contrast, 
submerged frames, while they similarly “identify problems in society, make diagnostic 
attributions, and suggest solutions,” are implicit rather than explicit and not a central 
focus. Some organizations, for instance, work on environmental justice issues related to 
open space or workplace safety, while framing them as community service issues only; 
these organizations have not bridged their grievances or frames to an environmental 
inequality or environmental justice master frame. 
With this Buffalo case study and other supporting examples, I will show how the 
environmental justice frame has extended – and can continue to extend – its applications 
to right-to-water and access issues in the United States. I will also show that, although 
residents over time used it as a frame to describe and address the effects of water 
management policies in Buffalo, it remained a submerged frame as they organized 
around the issue. 
 
Right to water 
Internationally, there is an ongoing conversation on water as a universal right. 
Particularly in light of the increasing private management and ownership of water 
services, many have framed this as a dichotomous controversy: either institutions of 
international governance view water as a basic human right or they view it as an 
economic commodity. Physicist and human rights activist Shiva views the ideological 
divide this way: 
There are, however, two conflicting paradigms for explaining the water 
crisis: the market paradigm and the ecological paradigm. The market 
paradigm sees water scarcity as a crisis resulting from the absence of 
water trade. If water could be moved and distributed freely through free 
markets, this paradigm holds, it would be transferred to regions of 
scarcity, and higher prices would lead to conservation. […] Market 
assumptions are blind to the ecological limits set by the water cycle and 
the economic limits set by poverty. Over-exploitation of water and 
disruption of the water cycle create absolute scarcity that markets cannot 
substitute with other commodities. […] Market solutions destroy the earth 
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and aggravate inequality. The solution to an ecological crisis is ecological, 
and the solution for injustice is democracy. (2002, p. 14-15) 
Shiva identifies three main limitations of market-based water systems: the lack of 
incentives to promote water conservation, to promote ecosystem protection, and to ensure 
access to water in poor communities. Additionally, she references democratic structures 
for accountability as a key component of a functional and just water system. Barlow has 
posited that the goal of providing water services in poor communities and the tactic of 
managing water privately are inherently incompatible; in order to reach equitable 
outcomes, public ownership is essential.  
For about two decades, the right-to-water community – with leadership from 
Shiva, Barlow, and others – has had a role on the main stage of water policy, working 
first against and then alongside the international diplomatic community. The arc of the 
United Nations’ engagement in the right to water and systems regulation attests to the 
impact of the nongovernmental pro-rights community over this time span. 
The UN’s Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development, adopted in 
1992, first recognized “the basic right of all human beings to have access to clean water 
and sanitation at an affordable price.” There had been references in prior binding 
documents pertaining to women and to children specifically, but this universal statement 
was notable. The delegates chose to imbed the statement under the principle that “water 
has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized as an economic 
good,” a decision that made it less valuable for water justice advocates. Further, the 
statement lacked implementation and enforcement mechanisms. 
As the international water industry grew in the 1990s, individuals’ personal 
experiences with it – and critiques of it – grew too. Local level movements began to form 
around the world to resist undemocratic water management practices and, gradually, 
these social movements began to connect to each other, often across continents. By 2003, 
resistance to private management had cropped up in far-flung cities, including Buenos 
Aires, Rio de Janeiro, Atlanta, Montreal, Grenoble (France), Potsdam (Germany), and 
Jakarta, among others. (See Hall, Lobina, de la Motte, 2005, and Public Citizen, 2003, for 
examples.) 
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Resistance to water privatization in Cochabamba, Bolivia was one of the largest 
and most widely broadcast instances of a local water access movement. In order to make 
necessary improvements to the city of Cochabamba’s water infrastructure, the Bolivian 
government had received a World Bank loan. Like hundreds of similar “structural 
adjustment programs,” this contract came with a number of conditions attached, one of 
which mandated that the system be operated by a company, a Bechtel subsidiary. Once 
the 40-year contract was signed, residents saw their water prices skyrocket almost 
immediately and advocates who attempted to direct loan funds to impoverished families 
unable to pay these bills found that a World Bank stipulation explicitly prevented the 
government from doing so. In January 2000, tens of thousands of people took part in 
several days of civil disobedience led by the group Coordiadora de Defense de Auga y la 
Vida, causing the country’s President to place the city under martial law and, ultimately, 
to terminate the water contract (Barlow and Clarke, 2002; Public Citizen, 2003). 
Strong organizing strategies brought international supporters of the anti-
privatization struggle to Cochabamba as political allies, helping to build relationships and 
infrastructure for this growing global social movement. Soon after, Barlow’s affiliate 
organization, the Council of Canadians, together with the Blue Planet Project, put 
together the Water for People and Nature conference. This event further cemented the 
movement’s cohesion and ability to organize.   
The UN’s Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights made a significant 
move towards the explicit recognition of water as a universal right in 2002. The 
Committee’s General Comment 15 was an addendum to its 1966 International Covenant 
– a treaty linked to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights – that had included 
articles on “the right to an adequate standard of living” and “the right to health.” Until 
2002, however, water was only an implicit component of these articles. The 18-page 
General Comment made this right formalized and explicit. 
The UN has been incorporating water access into its development strategies and 
metrics with increasing perseverance. The Millennium Development Goals, signed by all 
member states in 2001, included targets on sustainable water use and sustainable access 
to safe drinking water and sparked a campaign branding 2005-2015 the Water For Life 
Decade. Still, in the eyes of water justice and anti-privatization activists, the UN’s 
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campaigns were incomplete. Its tactics, they say, are closely tied with those of the IMF 
and World Bank – two institutions that have a history of placing restrictive conditions on 
water infrastructure loans and failing to build in mechanisms for accountability. 
In 2010, the UN took another major leap: it adopted a resolution, presented by a 
Bolivian representative, declaring water “a human right that is essential for the full 
enjoyment of life and all human rights.” It also pressed member states and international 
organizations to “scal[e] up efforts to provide safe, clean, accessible and affordable 
drinking water and sanitation for all.” Although the agreement is nonbinding, the 
organization Food & Water Watch declared it a “victory for water justice” and “a huge 
step in the right direction [...] toward legally binding recognition of the human right to 
water at the UN” (2011b). 
Still, without regulation, profit-driven water system arrangements continue to 
limit access for millions, and communities continue to respond. For many, the view that 
water-as-right is at odds with water-as-commodity that Shiva, Barlow, and others have 
invoked holds true. Extra-governmental organizing continues to evolve at all levels, from 
the local community to the global network.  
 
Two U.S. cases of municipal water privatization and debates 
Highland Park, Michigan was among the hundreds of North American cities who 
turned to private water management to solve a fiscal dilemma. Even more starkly than the 
average Midwestern city, the municipality of Highland Park had grave financial 
concerns. Once at the hub of the region’s auto manufacturing, the city – which is 
geographically surrounded by Detroit – experienced extreme population loss and 
disinvestment resulting in poverty rates near 40 percent and a shrunken tax base. From 
the peak of Ford and Chrysler’s economic presence to the late 1990s, it slid from over 
60,000 to about 15,000 inhabitants, nearly all of whom are Black. By 2000, the city’s 
financial situation was severe enough that the state hired a specialist to manage its 
multimillion-dollar debt and lead its attempt to regain its footing. 
The emergency financial manager, Ramona Henderson Pearson, used a 
combination of state loans and bonds to stabilize the city’s accounts. While some were 
advocating for merging with the city of Detroit, she was charged with balancing its 
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payments in the short term. Early in her tenure, Pearson observed that Highland Park’s 
disproportionately large water system could be a valuable site for restructuring. With 
plans underway to lease the system and make revenue from the plant’s excess water 
capacity, she began her efforts with a strengthened collections push. 
As a result of this policy change, dozens of residents began to receive water bills 
that were significantly higher than ever before – and in many cases, higher than they were 
able to pay. These charges reflected years of water loss due to leaks in the system and 
inaccurate billing, which were usually unknown to the water user, and many reached into 
the thousands of dollars. Residents would accumulate these bills without the means to 
pay for them and, after a period of time, the water department shut off service to their 
homes; the city’s next step was to attach the bill to property taxes and eventually 
foreclose on the house. 
A handful of Highland Park inhabitants, many of them older adults, banded 
together to strengthen their collective voice on these problems. They used an 
environmental justice and right-to-water frame to mobilize their neighbors and express 
their desired policy changes. One community organizer explained passionately, “When 
people can’t even have water to even take care of their basic needs, […] it’s ridiculous.” 
Their tireless efforts paid off when the city council turned down Pearson’s proposal for 
an investment firm to manage the city’s water system. Soon after, Michigan’s governor 
asked Pearson to step down from her position, and a manager with Highland Park roots 
took her place. Organizers continued to work toward fair billing practices (Miller, 2007). 
Since this experience, the city of Detroit made a shift toward similar water billing 
policies, bringing further attention to water justice efforts in the region. 
Milwaukee, another formerly industrial center in the Midwest, was among many 
cities facing budgetary challenges in the fall of 2008. City Comptroller Wally Morics, an 
elected official, put a system privatization idea on the table as a money saving approach, 
assuring the public that he was committed to a fully transparent process. He opened the 
door for proposals to lease the system, considering contracts of up to 99 years.  
The city’s publicly run Water Works supplied water to its 600,000 residents and 
more than a dozen suburbs, doing so with award winning results. It brought in about $70 
million annually, which was invested back into the system in accordance to state 
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requirements. Morics saw a lease for more than a half of a billion dollars as a mechanism 
for funneling money back into the city coffers annually, via a new endowment. 
As the applications flowed in, very little information was made available for 
public or third party review. A group of citizens mobilized quickly around the issue of the 
process’s transparency as well as the long-term viability of the proposed contracts, 
forming a group called Keep Public Our Water. One of their primary concerns was that 
the winning management team would be much less accountable to the area’s residents 
than the government was. They also cited consistently raised rates in comparable cases of 
private management across the country (see for example Food & Water Watch, 2010, p. 
7). The group used the common framing of government transparency, accountability to 
residents, and the right to publicly run, stably priced water in order to mobilize significant 
crowds to protest the decision. Eventually, the residents – supported by the expertise and 
resources of some larger, national nonprofit organizations – convinced their council 
officials to vote down a contract. The group has gone on to pursue a citywide law to ban 
future water system privatization locally.  
Examples like these of local-level responses to privately run water operations 
abound. Each is unique in its details – terms of engagement with a company, effects on 
residents, role and tactics of community organizers, and outcomes. At the same time, 
exploring multiple case studies in depth reveals striking trends about the processes and 
effects of local water management contracts. 
In both Milwaukee and Highland Park, residents reacted to plans to privatize their 
water system with community mobilization that eventually had an impact on policies. 
Community members in Highland Park, who were primarily Black residents, organized 
around an environmental justice frame, invoking the right to access natural resources 
including water. They bridged their experiences to the environmental justice master 
frame in a way that was explicit and potent. In Milwaukee, where organizers represented 
a range of mid-income households and multiple races and ethnicities, the master frame 
emphasized the value of public governance and accountability, as well as the right to 
access water, as arguments against privatization. The group that formed there developed a 
partnership with the national organization Food & Water Watch, linking it to the 
collective resources of the broad movement for public water management in the U.S.  
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This case study will explore how residents in Buffalo, New York – a city that 
bears both demographic and geographic similarities to Highland Park and Milwaukee – 
responded to water privatization over time. Using accounts of these two and other cases 
of municipal water contracting as a baseline for analysis, I will investigate how Buffalo’s 





Chapter 3:  
Buffalo: A lakeside city 
“We got the Great Lakes sitting right out there. And everybody else getting our 
water but us.” – Detroit resident (Truth Commission for Water Rights, 2008) 
  
The story of Buffalo’s water management in the late 1990s and 2000s unfolded in 
the context of several relevant social and political threads. In this chapter, I outline the 
background of the Great Lakes region’s water resources and management, the 
metropolitan area’s 20th century evolution, and the city’s prior water management 
decisions. The gradual development between 2001 and 2009 of the Great Lakes 
Agreement and Compact, a binational commitment supporting sustainable water 
withdrawal, coincided with Buffalo’s debates over water privatization in this case study, 
forming a backdrop of uncertain resource stability and governance. The city’s declining 
population and wealth through the 1970s and 1980s drove its leaders’ interest in water 
privatization and a key decision in 1992 made private management more likely. I lay out 
these aspects of the natural resource management and sociopolitical context in three 
sections. Finally, I conclude the chapter with descriptions of my research questions and 
case study methodology. 
 
Great Lakes watershed 
Together, North America’s five Great Lakes comprise a significant portion of the 
earth’s water: about 20% of all its freshwater and about 85% of the continent’s. Four of 
the Great Lakes are among the globe’s largest ten lakes by surface area. In the Great 
Lakes Basin, 90% of water withdrawals are taken from the lakes themselves, while the 
rest is sourced from groundwater and tributaries. Of the total withdrawals in the Basin, 
95% is returned and 5% is rendered unusable, i.e. it is withdrawn for “consumptive use.” 
The consumptive uses in the region are primarily public water supply, irrigation, and 
industry. Michigan, Wisconsin, and Ontario collectively make up about 69% of the 
Basin’s water consumption, while New York – at 6% – is among 7 states and provinces 
dividing the remainder of the consumption (International Joint Commission, 2000). 
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Until 2005, water management practice in the Great Lakes region was patchwork, 
varying by state, province, county, and municipality. A federal act protected the region 
from unregulated water diversion outside of the area, but Nestlé was in the process of 
arguing that this law was unconstitutional in court. If the courts ruled in favor of this 
argument – either on the Nestlé case or another in the future – little would stand between 
water-selling companies and unsustainable withdrawal.   
In the late 1990s, the leaders of all eight states and two provinces bordering the 
lakes embarked on a six-year process of writing the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River 
Basin Sustainable Water Resources Agreement and Compact to codify the region’s water 
management standards. Obtaining the necessary support in state and provincial legislative 
bodies was an arduous process, but gradually the document was ratified on both sides of 
the border (Annin, 2006). It was signed into U.S. federal law in 2008 and by 2009 both 
Ontario and Quebec had passed corresponding legislation. 
The Compact laid out a set of rules and regulations primarily designed to keep the 
Basin’s water within the watershed, with specific provisions for sustainable use and 
sustainable economic development. Building upon the nonbinding 1985 Great Lakes 
Charter and its 2001 Annex, it defines the Great Lakes waters as including rivers and 
groundwater in the Basin and prohibits new diversions outside of the watershed, with 
exceptions that allow communities and counties that straddle the Basin to apply for non-
consumptive use allowances (and with a specific exemption for Chicago’s water supply). 
The agreement also requires that states regulate water use in the Basin and that they each 
adopt a water conservation plan. Notably, it concedes that water shipped from the Basin 
in bottles smaller that 5.7 gallons is not considered a diversion, an outcome of water 
industry involvement in the negotiations and the shaky legal case of differentiating 
extraction for water bottling from the extraction inherent in soft drinks, beer, and even 
agricultural products. 
 
Buffalo’s social and political history 
From the community’s inception, Buffalonians were attracted to water sources 
and water-based travel. The Village of Buffalo, like many, formed around the turn of the 
19th century with lakes and rivers as its focal points: Lake Erie and the Niagara and 
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Buffalo Rivers lie adjacent to the city and Lake Ontario is just miles north. The city 
experienced a major expansion and identity change with the opening of the Erie Canal in 
1825, which linked the Hudson River at Albany to the Great Lakes at Buffalo. As a 
necessary gateway for any cargo traveling from New York City to the Midwest, Buffalo 
became a unique national crossroads. This status was reinforced by the presence of 
several intersecting railway lines, which also treated the city as a trans-regional exchange 
point (Kraus, 2000).  
As commerce and industry followed the pathways of growing transportation 
systems to Western New York, so too did people.  The Underground Railroad brought 
tens of thousands of formerly enslaved African Americans through the city en route to 
freedom between the 1830s and 1860s; over time many settled there or returned from 
Canada after the Emancipation Proclamation.  Immigrants from Italy, Ireland, Poland, 
and Germany formed enclaves in the city, following the promise of jobs and economic 
stability and, later, the presence of a familiar European ethnic community. 
While agricultural goods first dominated its trade routes, Buffalo’s economy had 
begun to diversify significantly by the 1880s. The shipping of iron ore and the needs of 
the railroad companies led the city to build up steel manufacturing, in addition to its grain 
processing. Shipping and steel were the primary drivers of the region’s economy for the 
first few decades of the century. The 1901 Pan-American Exposition showed the world 
that the region was ready to be an industrial frontrunner, illuminating the fairgrounds 
with Tesla’s new alternating current technology. 
By the 1940s, auto parts and aircraft had been added to the city’s production list. 
This list increased manifold when World War II drove a manufacturing boom; in 1943, 
Buffalo was home to five billion dollars in lucrative war supply contracts, with the 5th 
highest number of contracts of any city in the country. These industries employed about 
225,000 people, or nearly half of the local workforce (Goldman, 2007). 
War-related industry created more of a demand for workers than the region’s 
labor force could sustain. Still, these jobs were extremely stratified by race and gender 
and hiring and promotion practices consistently benefited White male workers. The 
area’s federally operated Work Manpower Commission identified these trends in 1942 
and created policies to both fill the labor shortage and to employ the full spectrum of the 
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region’s work-ready individuals – particularly men of color and White women. This 
effort was moderately successful, although extreme racial and gender imbalances at each 
job level persisted long after.   
The promise of wartime employment brought Blacks to Buffalo in significant 
numbers: in 1940 there were 17,694 Black residents and in 1945 that number had grown 
to over 25,000, more than half of whom worked in war-related industries (Goldman, 
2007). Still, Black unemployment was significantly higher than the citywide rates 
throughout the post-war period. According to 1950 and 1960 Census data, Blacks were 
“overrepresented in lower-wage service sector jobs and underrepresented in 
manufacturing” (Kraus, 2000). 
At the end of the war, the commercial and manufacturing sectors were still abuzz 
in the region, but they had already started to detach from the city proper. In 1930 the 
central business district accounted for 52% of metro area sales in 1930 and less than half 
that in 1940 (Goldman, 2007). Post-war planners began to focus their attention on the 
shift to the automobile and the suburban commute and structured their plans accordingly, 
stressing the addition of parking lots downtown. As urban renewal’s ideologies and 
policies – notably the American Housing Act of 1949 – were taking hold across the 
country, Buffalo was no exception to the anti-ghetto and high-rise public housing trends. 
(Table 3-1 shows the population trends in the city and the surrounding county.) The 
Buffalo Evening News espoused this belief, admonishing residents: “Buffalo had better 
lose no time equipping itself to take advantage of the [Housing Act of 1949] program: the 
clearing of our slums is too urgent to risk ‘missing the boat’ for want of a local initiative” 
(quoted in Goldman, 2007). 
As in many cities, urban renewal projects were a large contributor to the changing 
city landscape.  The construction of the New York State Thruway in the early 1950s 
provided further fuel for urban renewal endeavors (Goldman, 2007).  These practices, 
however, overestimated the increasing centrality of the automobile and inadequately 
addressed the displacement of hundreds of impoverished families. Rather than spurring 
urban development, they heightened racial and class segregation and initiated the creation 
of the urban ghetto (see Price, 1991).  
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A small number of leaders, including Buffalonian architect Robert Coles, saw 
great potential in improving the city with dense, mixed-use, and pedestrian-friendly 
neighborhoods, in line with the theories that Jane Jacobs was publishing at the time. The 
mainstream views throughout the country, though, prevailed, and local downtown 
business and real estate owners teamed up to invest in and implement a businesses district 
version of urban renewal (Goldman, 2007).  With the characteristic fervor of the urban 
“growth machine” (Logan and Molotch), Buffalo’s resource-holding leaders of the 1960s 
made it a decade of physical transition, with old buildings coming down and new 
buildings coming up almost weekly. While in the city center this primarily affected small 
business owners, many of whom were from Italian and Polish immigrant families, a 
whole spectrum of residents in the surrounding urban neighborhoods felt the blow closer 
to home. 
As urban renewal efforts plowed forward, community-based reactions and 
activism of all varieties were just a step behind. In the summer of 1967 a group of 
disillusioned and unsatisfied Black youth went on a destructive spree through ghetto 
streets, sparking police intervention and a neighborhood riot. The standoff that ensued 
eventually brought in over 400 officers and, at the end, at least forty protesting 
community members required medical treatment. This relatively high-profile incident 
was indicative of race-based and geographical tensions that were prevalent at the time. 
A number of Black leaders also promoted nonviolent tactics to seek the attention 
of government officials and gain ground in integration, rights, and access. The same year 
as the riot, organizers decided to bring in Saul Alinsky – although his methods of civil 
disobedience were somewhat controversial among community members – and formed an 
Industrial Areas Foundation affiliate called Build Unity, Independence, Liberty and 
Dignity (BUILD). While the Black community was not completely unified under this 
umbrella, BUILD helped to create an infrastructure and platform for affecting change in 
the city, first in the education system and later in fair housing and other issues. A handful 
of similar organized groups in impoverished and disenfranchised neighborhoods also 
developed their voices in the late 1960s and 1970s. In response to Department of 
Transportation plans that would further bifurcate communities in 1971, Puerto Rican and 
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Mexican communities organized collaboratively to maintain local fabric and were 
ultimately successful in preventing highway expansion on the Lower West Side. 
Historians tend to pin the economic decline of the city on two major changes: the 
1959 opening of the St. Lawrence Seaway, which provided a new route from the Eastern 
seaboard to Great Lakes states, and the subsequent loss of the steel industry from 1971 to 
1983. Dillaway shows that changes in transportation routes, international marketplace 
competition, and technological developments in both manufacturing and materials were 
all elements of the steel industry’s exodus. During this shift, long-distance management 
of local operations became more common, which further contributed to the loss of 
Buffalo’s economy (2006). 
Specific data on the Buffalo Two-County Area of Erie and Niagara between 1965 
and 1980 revealed that companies with out-of-town headquarters were twice as 
likely to close as locally owned companies. Conversely, locally owned firms were 
more likely to expand. 
By 1986, outside forces controlled nearly three quarters of Buffalo’s local 
and regional economy. Among the largest firms of five hundred or more 
employees in the eight-county Buffalo region, 69.4 percent were either branches 
or subsidiaries of nonregional businesses. 
Dillaway goes on to hypothesize that, in part because of this trend of outside 
ownership, the region’s economy fell prey to the dynamics of elite political and economic 
entities competing for power.  When it came to any major planning decision in the 1970s 
and ’80s, for instance, at least five government bodies and dozens of other organizations 
were angling to protect their own interests. Analyzing decades of political and local 
development decision making, she concludes that complex networks of power and 
patronage among White residents systematically protected the socioeconomic status quo 
for years. But these same entrenched arrangements also helped spark the Black-led 
community movements that eventually led to substantial leadership change. 
Several researchers have shown how – across the country, but especially in 
Midwestern cities – the loss of major industries combined with residential 
suburbanization led to increased concentrations of urban poverty in the 1970s and 1980s.  
These trends hold in Buffalo: according to Massey and Denton’s five-pronged metric of 
racial/ethnic segregation, Buffalo was one of only 16 U.S. metro areas displaying what 
they dub “hypersegregation” in 1980.  To show one aspect of this index, the average poor 
Black family in Buffalo in 1970 lived in a neighborhood that was 27% poor and the 
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average poor White family lived in a neighborhood that was 11.4% poor; by 1980, these 
had gone up by 9.2% and 2.6%, respectively, meaning that impoverished Blacks were 
considerably more isolated than impoverished Whites. This held true in cities across the 
country, but Buffalo’s rates of Black poverty isolation were higher than average. In 1990, 
the city’s overall segregation index was still higher than it was in 1980 (Massey and 
Denton, 1998). 
Poverty – and in particular the concentration of Black poverty – in Buffalo 
remains high today (see Table 3-2).  Its causes, like those in dozens of similar cities, are a 
complex set of interwoven factors, including residential patterns and housing 
discrimination, employment trends and discrimination, and political power. Writing on 
Buffalo, Kraus holds that the Black community’s high poverty level was not solely a 
result of city-wide economic decline; rather, systemic policies and discriminatory 
decision making caused the Black community to lag behind the White community in 
wealth, employment, and compensation measures even at the region’s economic peak. 
This was a larger factor than simply being “left behind” during regional shifts including 
de-industrialization and suburbanization (2000). 
 
Table 3-1. Population change in Buffalo and Erie County, 1920-2009 (Census data) 
Year Population, 
Buffalo 




% Change in 
county 
% County 
pop. In city 
1920 506,775  19.6%    634,668 20.0% 79.8% 
1930 573,076  13.1%    762,408 20.1% 75.2% 
1940 575,901   0.5%    798,377   4.7% 72.1% 
1950 580,132   0.7%    899,238 12.6% 64.5% 
1960 532,759  -8.2% 1,064,688 18.4% 50.0% 
1970 462,768 -13.1% 1,113,491  4.6% 41.6% 
1980 357,870 -22.7% 1,015,472 -8.8% 35.2% 
1990 328,123   -8.3%    968,532 -4.6% 33.9% 
2000 292,648 -10.8%    950,265 -1.9% 30.8% 
2009* 270,240   -7.7%    909,845 -4.3% 29.7% 
*July 1, 2009 estimate 
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Table 3-2. Census (2000) and American Community Survey (1999) 
 Buffalo (city) Erie County 
(incl. Buffalo) 
Niagara County 
Population 270,240 909,247 214,557 
White 54.4% 82.6% 89.7% 
White, non-
Hispanic/Latino 
N/A 80.8% 79.3% 
Black 37.2% 13.5% 6.8% 
Hispanic/Latino 7.5% 4.0% 1.9% 
Median household 
income* 
$30,376 $46,609 $45,749 
*Notes: 1) N/A – not available. 2) All data from U.S. Census, 2000, except median 
household income, (in 2009 inflation-adjusted dollars), which is from American 
Community Survey, 1999. 
 
Buffalo’s water management history 
Before Buffalo had even formed as a town in 1810, thousands of European 
settlers in the area retrieved their daily drinking water from private wells. Once the 
customer base was large enough, at least one entrepreneur sold jugs of Lake Erie’s 
plentiful resource from his horse-drawn cart to those without well access. With $20,000 
in start-up funds, the Jubilee Water Works became the area’s first water company in 1827 
– still five years before the City of Buffalo was officially incorporated – and it 
transported well and spring water through hollowed-log pipes to city residents. Supplying 
a complementary portion of the region, the 1852-established Buffalo Water Works Co. 
sourced from the Niagara River and utilized a reservoir. In 1868 the city purchased both 
companies and the local water withdrawal, treatment, and delivery processes became 
public (Buffalo Water Authority, 2010; French, 1859/2002, p. 284; Pollack, 1992). 
The central site of the modern system is the Colonel Ward Pumping Station, 
whose construction was completed in 1915, around the same time that the city introduced 
chlorination. Its water intake is on the shore of Lake Erie, adjacent to the mouth of the 
Niagara River. In the 1990s, the system processed about 90 million gallons daily for over 
300,000 people, covering an area of 46 square miles (Buffalo Water Authority, 1999). 
The department housed about 180 employees (Fairbanks, 1996). The city’s waste water 
system, bureaucratically a separate department, is a combined sewage and runoff system, 
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meaning that especially high levels of precipitation could have negative effects on 
drinking water quality. As of 2010, the city began to address this problem with 
stormwater reduction and redirection techniques. 
The surrounding county has a separate system, which became incorporated as a 
public benefit corporation, the Erie County Water Authority, in 1949. This status allowed 
it to receive large state loans, while operating as an independent, self-sustaining entity. In 
1996 the Water Authority reached about 500,000 individual residents, about half of those 
in the county (Vogel, 1996). A quasi-governmental, private institution, it has agreements 
with a collection of municipalities in the greater Buffalo area, both in and adjacent to Erie 
County, covering three different types of arrangements: bulk sale of water with no 
responsibility for operations; leased management with responsibility for operations, but 
not system improvements; and complete system and operations ownership (Jones, 2009). 
As a result of the industrial loss and suburban migration of the 1970s and 1980s, 
cities across the steel and automotive manufacturing region of the Midwest faced severe 
budget crises. In 1992 Mayor James Griffin had on his hands a budget deficit of nearly 
$20 million, which was expected to increase the following year. Like a multitude of 
municipal leaders at that time, Mayor Griffin found that receiving support from Albany 
or Washington was decreasingly likely, and the primary option available to him was 
raising funds through the issuance of bonds (Hackworth, 2007). 
In the immediate aftermath of the city’s credit rating falling (from ‘BBB+’ to 
‘BBB’), Mayor Griffin and City Comptroller Joel A. Giambra proposed a quick-fix 
solution: the formation of a Buffalo Water Finance Authority, which would take out a 
loan of about $20 million at a better interest rate than the city itself would have obtained 
and use the loan to buy the water system assets from the city. As a result, the city would 
have the revenue to balance its budget in the short term; in the long term, the authority 
would have to raise water rates to pay off the debt. This option had become feasible just 
seven years prior, when New York State law initially gave the city the power to create 
this type of authority. 
In the months before the new fiscal year’s budget was to be finalized, this asset 
sale was the primary option that the mayor touted as a way to provide the city with 
needed resources. His plan would prevent the city’s deficit from growing and allow it to 
36 
    
enter the new fiscal year with about $57 million of debt rather than $70 million. To 
balance the new budget, the proposal included some additional changes – including 
property and utility tax increases, service cuts, and employee layoffs – but these were 
relatively small. Under the plan, the Water Authority would be committed to contributing 
$4 million per year in revenue to the general city budget, which was a practice of the 
Water Department at the time. Griffin and other city leaders assured the public that, while 
the new entity would have a mayor- and council-approved board that set water rates, it 
would entail no shift in staffing or operating structure.  
The Water Finance Authority plan received criticism from within the city’s 
legislative body as well as from the third sector. Taxpayers Action Network of Western 
New York, in particular, opposed the creation of a water authority as a rushed, stopgap 
measure, saying that alternatives had not been adequately researched. Some residents 
objected that the new structure would make water system decision making one step 
further removed from the public and its accountability to voters would decrease. An 
affiliate of a civic group explained to The Buffalo News that the idea was a carefully 
crafted legal and fiscal strategy that would only address the budget crisis in the short 
term: “Peter Ruh, a member of Taxpayers Action Network of Western New York, said 
the city’s plan… is a maneuver to avoid laws prohibiting long-term borrowing to balance 
the budget. ‘Basically they're trying to bond out their deficit,’ Ruh said. ‘It (the authority) 
is a paper agency. All of its employees are city employees’” (Collison, 1992). Ruh and 
others believed that, rather than including substantive changes, the proposal was 
essentially a financial trick that would give the appearance of a balanced budget. 
Residents and government watchdog groups were also concerned by the new 
authority’s mandate to send $4 million in water revenue to the city’s funds each year. 
They asserted that this could discourage needed system improvements in the future and 
that it would only necessitate water rate increases in the long term, simply delaying the 
impact on residents. The city’s newspaper reported: 
Council President George Arthur said Saturday that he opposes the authority 
because it could cost the city money in the long run. Rather than settling for a 
one-time infusion of $25 million, Arthur contends the city would be better off 
settling for a continuous stream of money that could be reaped if the city retained 
ownership of the water system and raised water rates. Arthur voted to raise water 
rates earlier this year to help close the budget deficit.  (Heaney, 1992). 
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The local business community came together to state its support for the plan, 
however, citing serious concerns with the municipality’s fiscal status, its credit rating, 
and its ability to recover in the coming years. Many city officials, as well as the editorial 
staff of The Buffalo News, shared these concerns, and also noted that the sale would allow 
for needed investments in water system infrastructure. (The system’s treatment plant was 
built in 1926 and officials all agreed it required upgrades; pipes throughout the city were 
in serious need of attention as well.) Overwhelmingly, the powerful institutions in the 
city agreed with the mayor’s budget proposal, including the creation of a Water Finance 
Board. 
With eventual support from the governor, the mayor’s budget passed the Common 
Council in a 9-4 vote. According to The Buffalo News, the average Buffalo family in 
1992 used about 100,000 gallons of water per year and paid $107; under the new plan, 
which included an 11.8 percent rate increase, this went up to $123 per year. By the close 
of the next fiscal year, Buffalo’s books were once again balanced. Still, the water 
department’s budgeting was predicated on continued rate increases over several years. To 
continue to reach its revenue goals, the Buffalo Water Board continued to pass significant 
rate increases over the following three years (see Table 4-1). An evolving discourse on 
water management emerged among policy makers, city officials, county officials, 
businesses, and residents that would last nearly two decades. 
 
Research Questions 
The primary question that guided my research of Buffalo’s water management 
discourse between 1996 and 2008 was the following: did the framing of the issue change 
over time and, if so, how? I sought to answer this question through both a historical 
narrative review and an empirical content analysis of newspaper coverage. 
Through a historical analysis of Buffalo’s water management debates as well as 
background from related case studies (including those of Highland Park, Michigan and 
Milwaukee, described in Chapter 2), I compiled a set of frames that appeared or were 
likely to appear in Buffalo’s discourse. Snow and colleagues have developed a frame 
alignment theory, based on Goffman’s work, defining how social movement 
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organizations tend to align a set of existing beliefs among individuals with a set of 
actions in order to mobilize resources and achieve desired outcomes. They posit that 
some kind of linkage is required between “individual interests, values, and beliefs and 
[organizations’] activities, goals, and ideology” in order to spur movement participation 
(1986). As described in Chapter 2, Taylor built on this work by defining an 
environmental justice paradigm, which sometimes serves as an explicitly named master 
frame and other times is a submerged frame, invoked indirectly (2000).  
Using these concepts, I identified several social movement frames with which city 
residents – in Buffalo and elsewhere – have aligned their belief systems on water 
management issues. For instance, when the mayor of Stockton, California cited a 
neoliberal argument to make the case that private companies are universally more 
efficient than government agencies, resident responses involved bridging their interests 
and values regarding their city (valuing their authority to collectively engage in the water 
decision-making process) with an existing social movement frame (the anti-privatization 
movement with an emphasis on public governance in water management). When 
Highland Park’s leader proposed private water management as a cost-cutting measure, 
residents linked their grievances and beliefs (already high water bills and a belief in 
affordable water) with a second existing social movement frame (environmental justice). 
In both cases, they used a master frame; they developed their movements’ language and 
tactics in accordance with existing framing in a way that was explicit and potent in its 
ability to mobilize people to action. 
In my case study, I analyzed the appearance of these and other frames in the 
discourse on water management in Buffalo. Based upon their selection of language and 
identification of problems, I investigated whether players situated themselves within the 
global right-to-water discourse, an environmental justice discourse, an anti-privatization 
discourse, or another existing frame and whether they bridged their experiences to these 
master frames or the frames remained submerged. I also examined whether neoliberal 
ideologies, particularly notions of the relative roles, responsibilities, and strengths of 
government and private enterprise, entered the debate. Finally, I sought to understand 
whether/how the public discussion changed over time as experience with private 
management accrued. 
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Methodology 
To capture and assess the political discourse on water management in Buffalo 
between 1997 and 2008, I used a two-pronged method, incorporating both qualitative and 
quantitative techniques. First, I surveyed the historical record – including city 
documentation, local newspaper articles, and interviews with city lawmakers and 
advocates – to piece together a narrative account of the emergence and evolution of 
private water management. Second, I conducted a content analysis of over 200 articles, 
editorials, opinion pieces, and letters from the local newspaper The Buffalo News to 
quantitatively examine the discursive trends that I had observed.  
Content analysis describes a set of techniques for the systematic examination and 
analysis of communication. In her book defining the methodology, Neuendorf explains 
that components of the scientific method – such as objectivity (while acknowledging that 
the researcher is always present in a line of inquiry), an a priori design, reliability, 
validity, generalizability, and replicability – must be present (2002). In this discourse 
analysis, I also understood my source to be both representative of and contributing to the 
socio-political events at the time; that is, the articles I analyze were not always passive 
players in the development of particular trends. 
I selected a time span to analyze, beginning with the mayor’s first mention of 
private management in 1997 and closing with the second decision to renew the contract 
in 2008. Using a database search engine, I selected all coverage of the city’s water 
management system in The Buffalo News between those benchmarks, a set of 205 
articles, editorials, opinion pieces, and letters; 65, 90, and 50 articles from each respective 
phase. As I developed the historical account of the debates during this period, I noted 
specific, recurring arguments for and against private management. I then tabulated the 
appearance of each of these arguments – both in the writer’s voice and secondhand – 
throughout the set of articles. I also tabulated the number of direct or indirect statements 
supportive of privatization, against privatization, supportive of a city-county merger, or 
neutral attributed to each of eight different categories of stakeholders. 
In the next chapter, I describe the three phases of the public discussion that I 
discovered during my historical research. I then summarize my analysis of the raw 
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content data to investigate the validity of my qualitative assessments. Throughout this 
analysis, I characterize which arguments were used during each of the periods, identify 
who used these arguments, and note how the prevalence of particular arguments shifted 
over time. This data analysis complemented my qualitative examination of the historical 
record. Using these combined methods, I drew conclusions about the discourse on water 





Buffalo’s Water Management Decisions, 1996-2008 
 
“[T]he water division has the right to shut off service, but did so in only 20 
percent of the cases [of overdue bills].” - The Buffalo News (Fairbanks, 1996b) 
 
“But Mitchell said her bill continues to grow. 
‘Where is the end? [When] they put me out on the street?’ Mitchell 
asked, choking back tears.” - The Buffalo News (Meyer, 2008d) 
 
In the span between Mayor Masiello’s first mention of private water management 
in 1996 and the Common Council and the Water Board’s third major contract decision in 
2008, I identify three major phases of discourse among policy makers and community 
members. In this chapter, I give a historical analysis of the three phases and the 
arguments and frames that the various players employed during each one, applying the 
work of Snow and colleagues on social movement frames and frame alignment (1986) 
and Taylor on environmental justice as a master frame or a submerged frame (2000), as 
described in Chapter 2. Using the results of my content analysis of over 200 local 
newspaper articles covering these debates, I also provide support for my observations on 
issue framing. 
In 1992, Mayor Griffin finalized the sale of Buffalo’s water system to a newly 
created Water Finance Authority in order to balance the city’s budget, but neither the 
city’s nor the department’s budgetary concerns ended then. At the conclusion of Griffin’s 
fourth term in January 1994, his successor, Anthony Masiello, inherited a number of 
challenges, including the water system’s finances and aging infrastructure. By then the 
public was already becoming increasingly aware of water management decisions, 
particularly rate increases. In this context, Mayor Masiello began to investigate the option 
of private water management. 
In the first phase of the 12-year period, government officials discussed the 
possibility of contracting with a private manager and then weighed proposals; the primary 
players from civil society were public unions and their framing was that the proposal 
would affect jobs. In the second phase, policy debates centered simultaneously on the 
possibility of regionalizing the system and the approaching expiration of the first five-
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year contract. During this period, residents began to participate in the conversation, often 
spurred by their experiences with mandatory and expensive meter installations as well as 
rate increases. They began to formulate a homeowners’/renters’ rights and accountability 
frame, but it did not have the strength to mobilize many individuals. By the third phase, 
the water department had begun to lean more heavily on residential water shut-offs and 
property liens as enforcement tools for overdue water payments. As the third debate 
period centered on the expiration of the second five-year contract, residents and housing 
advocates became more vocal, developing a submerged (or implicit) frame on rights and 
environmental justice. When the decision was finally made to extend the contract again, 
elements of these residents’ requests were incorporated into the new policy. Following 
these three periods (and beyond the scope of this study), city officials allowed the third 
contract with the original firm to expire and developed a different type of management 
arrangement with a new company. 
 
The early years of the Buffalo Water Finance Authority 
After Mayor Griffin balanced the city’s budget in 1992 by creating a new quasi-
public entity to take out large loans and purchase the city’s water system assets, water 
rate increases became a regular occurrence for Buffalo residents, as a means of balancing 
the Buffalo Water Finance Authority’s annual budget (see Table 4-1). Gradually, civic 
complaints and protests about these rate changes also became routine. At a public hearing 
on the 1994 rate decision, the local paper reported that about six residents appeared 
before the board to object to the change. The concerns they raised included a minimum 
charge that fails to encourage water conservation, the efficiency of the water system’s 
bureaucracy, and the choice to take on infrastructure improvements while resolving the 
city’s debt crisis. One council member present shared some of their concerns, pointing 
out that the brunt of the costs is borne by small businesses and residents. Nonetheless, the 
council passed its third consecutive rate increase in the yearly budget. 
Each year, the Water Board first proposed the rate change it deemed necessary 
and the Common Council and mayor then made a final determination when they passed 
the city’s annual budget. After Griffin did not run for reelection in 1993, former New 
York State Senator, Anthony Masiello, became mayor and took on the role, bringing with 
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him similar, conservative Democratic stances. Under the Authority’s governance 
structure, there was a recurring debate on the tradeoff between making infrastructure 
improvements in a timely way and maintaining relatively stable water rates. In 1994, for 
instance, the Water Board proposed a budget that included a large rate increase in order 
to fund an extensive capital projects plan. Both the mayor and council members 
repeatedly pushed back against this type of recommendation, holding that a large rate 
change was unwarranted. 
Within a few years of the Water Authority’s creation, city decision makers were 
apparently beginning to feel heightened pressure to stave off the annual rate hikes as 
well. Council members and administration officials alike began to advocate for creative 
solutions. The City Comptroller proposed, for instance, combining the city’s sewer and 
water authorities to save about a million dollars. The Council’s Finance Committee 
considered a more dramatic change in the water rate structure, commissioning 
recommendations from an outside engineering consultant. The options on the table 
included redistributing costs between residential, commercial, and industrial users. A 
year later, the Council President questioned the value of maintaining operations under the 
Water Authority at all and alluded to abolishing it. The council supported a feasibility 
study on reverting to its pre-1992 management structure. Plans to make drastic 
bureaucratic changes like these did not, however, gain sufficient traction. 
Eventually, Mayor Masiello, too, spoke out against the 1992 arrangement. When 
the Water Board made a recommendation for job creation and new equipment totaling 
$1.8 million just six months after its fourth annual rate change had gone into effect, the 
city estimated that the proposal would necessitate a rate increase of about 12 percent in 
the first year and further increases in later years and the mayor lambasted the idea. He 
publicly faulted, among other things, his predecessor’s 1992 decision to sell the water 
system. Masiello said that Griffin’s fiscal move to create the Water Authority “might be 
the biggest boondoggle ever perpetrated on city residents,” noting that “they took all that 
money and none of it went to modernize the system” (Dolan, 1996). 
And despite Griffin’s quick fix, the city’s budgetary woes remained unresolved. 
At the end of 1994, an audit revealed that Buffalo’s previous fiscal year had left it with a 
surplus, and its credit rating went up a notch shortly after, but the following year the 
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city’s budget had a million-dollar deficit. The pipes and pumps of the water system were 
among the city’s many suffering assets; a significant amount of drinking water was being 
lost due to the city’s aging infrastructure, costing an estimated reached $4 million. Many 
– both in and out of city government – criticized the system’s inefficiency.  
The Water Board continued to propose rate increases, in order to support both 
operations and capital projects and to compensate for reported collections difficulties. 
After two consecutive rate increases under his watch, Masiello was approaching his first 
reelection campaign. That year, his administration supported a Water Board budget that 
would be paid for through more effective collection of fees, but no rate increase. After 
some discussion, the Water Board approved a much smaller, one percent increase. 
Alongside this change, the Common Council approved a plan from the mayor’s office to 
contract with M&T Bank to provide support for both city tax and water payment 
collections operations. 
Near the end of the mayor’s first term, discussions began on the possibility of 
merging the Erie County Water Authority – a private, regional entity – with the Buffalo 
Water Board. The Water Authority Chair and Mayor Masiello both touted the benefits of 
combining the city and county water systems. The city council formed a task force to 
examine the available options for joint county and city water management, from limited 
exchange of services to full consolidation. Support for this type of plan, however, was not 
unanimous within the two governments, nor among area residents. An early article on 
Masiello’s city-county merger recommendation framed the idea as economically efficient 
and opposition from the city employees’ union as the primary obstacle. 
In place of raising rates and creating more jobs, the mayor and [his Budget 
Director] Milroy argue the Water Board can help the city reduce the size of water 
crews and create competition by contracting [with the county water authority] for 
services. They also claimed that the three city labor unions involved have resisted 
change. (Dolan, 1996) 
Later that year, Masiello’s team shifted its attention to contracting with a private 
company, but both the regional management idea and the city-versus-union framing 
would continue to surface for years after. 
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Phase One: Engaging a private firm 
The driving force leading to a request for private management proposals was the 
city’s struggling budget. In all three phases, reference was made to the city’s fiscal crisis 
and the need for revenue – as an argument either for privatization, a city-county contract, 
or an alternative water management solution – more than once per relevant article on 
average. The vast majority of reviewed articles mentioned the budget, cost savings, or 
system efficiency at least once; many also referred to the city’s aging water infrastructure 
and the need for maintenance capital. Residents’ increasing water rates, an issue also 
mentioned at a ratio of more than once per article in the first phase, also characterized 
this period of discussion. No other reason was cited with a similar frequency. (See Table 
4-2 for content analysis results discussed throughout this chapter.) 
Prior to the mayor’s suggestion to invite proposals from private firms, officials 
and the local newspaper frequently discussed merging potable water operations with the 
region’s quasi-governmental water authority as an option. A slew of Erie County Water 
Authority resignations and firings related to ethics violations in 1996, however, rapidly 
changed the playing field for a merger. City leaders remained optimistic at first, 
applauding the city task force’s report on regional operations and immediately 
implementing small-scale joint efforts, such as conducting training programs and 
requesting state permission to make joint purchases. A merger seemed beneficial to 
many, given the regional authority’s success with efficiently operating a significant 
number of the county’s 170 variously sized, public water systems and serving about two-
thirds of Erie County’s non-Buffalo population, as well as others outside of the county.   
But several factors made this deal less simple than the task force might have 
originally anticipated. The city’s outdated, leaking infrastructure and its lack of metering 
technology meant added costs that the county authority would be sure to avoid placing on 
suburban residents; to compensate, city residents would face a surcharge in addition to 
the general rates. Also, the city had been relying on its ability to reap revenue from the 
Water Division towards its general operating budget, a practice that would have to cease. 
Adding further complications, the county authority was experiencing a $4 million loss – 
unexpected after a year of substantial profit – due to high interest payments on its bonds. 
The County Executive was also cutting spending, including the county water budget, and 
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the county authority began discussing its own water rate increases, despite having 
decreased rates the previous year. 
All of these factors were probably relevant to the city’s leadership when – in 
accordance with task force findings – they decided to pursue a slightly broader tack than 
a merger. Without closing off the possibility of working together with the county, the 
Common Council began to discuss a request for proposals (RFP) for operating the water 
system. Officials were clear that the Erie County Water Authority, a qualified private 
enterprise, might choose to submit a proposal. The search’s aim was first to price options 
for operations – not an asset sale – and then make a decision over the course of several 
months. Many in the administration expressed differing inclinations about potential 
directions, including city-county contracting, water-sewage consolidation, and various 
degrees of private firm engagement.  
With significant support from council members as well as the Public Works 
Commissioner, Mayor Masiello invited proposals for water system management. Five 
companies applied (with one pulling itself from the competition early); four of these were 
based out of state and most had ties to international firms. The three companies in the 
running in March 1997 – American Anglian Environmental Technologies of Voorhees, 
N.J.; Professional Service Group of Houston; and United Water/JMM of Wayne, 
Pennsylvania – had slightly different cost estimates and staffing plans. All of the 
proposals contained guarantees that they would not trim the workforce immediately, 
planning to cut its size by attrition and early retirement incentives rather than layoffs. 
American Anglian’s eventually stood out, promising to avoid any layoffs throughout the 
five years of the contract. 
The most prominent cases in favor of privatization were that it would save costs 
for the city and decrease rates for residents. The Masiello administration brought the 
conversation about privatizing the water system to the fore in early 1997. Officials 
framed this as a cost-saving measure and assured residents that the city would not be 
“selling” their water. The city would continue to own the system, they emphasized, and 
would simply sell the right to operate it. Public Works Commissioner Joseph N. Giambra 
predicted a decrease in water rates as a result of the plan. 
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Alongside general improvements in operations efficiency, proponents of a private 
management contract emphasized the importance of improving the city’s water payment 
collections. A few months earlier, data had surfaced showing that the city was coming up 
short on its water and sewer revenue estimates by over $11 million. Much of this bill debt 
was incurred by large institutions, like area hospitals, which themselves were unable to 
maintain a balanced budget; a large portion was also held by individuals and families. 
The city had been working with a firm to collect some of these outstanding payments and 
had a strong interest in further improving this component of water management’s 
operations. A water authority audit from the prior year alluded to ways in which a 
centralized contract with a firm might enhance this system, including sending letters to 
users with overdue charges and enforcing repercussions – through fees or water shut-offs 
– more consistently (Fairbanks, 1996b). For those who supported firm-led operations in 
early 1997, the flaws in the city’s collections systems were further grounds for 
considering privatization. 
The challenges to the idea centered on the loss of jobs, with white- and blue-collar 
city unions serving as spokespeople for most of the concerns in local press coverage. 
Under any of the proposed partnerships, the unions’ contracts would be terminated; they 
would have the opportunity to unionize again and renegotiate terms. During the RFP 
process, union leaders requested that the city conduct an outside study on alternative cost-
cutting restructuring possibilities. The city agreed, with the caveat that the unions sponsor 
the nearly 150,000-dollar study themselves, an idea to which they adamantly objected, 
contending that the mayor had backed down from his commitment to thoroughly examine 
alternatives. The language that many used to describe this multi-stakeholder process often 
created the image of a political clash, with the unions standing as an obstacle in the city’s 
path to structural and fiscal improvements. 
“When the (Masiello) administration proposed privatization, the unions made it 
clear they did not want to participate and that they were going to use all legal 
means to rebuke it,” Joel Giambra said. 
“Seeing that we were headed for a significant confrontation, I thought this 
proposal would give the unions a chance to bid for the work and begin to 
understand the art of competition and possibly to lay the groundwork for future 
discussions with other bargaining units in the city,” he added. (McNeil, 1997) 
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From the dialogue’s outset, the coverage in The Buffalo News captured two sides 
pit against each other: city officials who supported private management and union 
officials who challenged it. Members of government framed the issue as one of cost 
effectiveness and an opportunity to cut rates, while workers framed it in terms of 
downsizing, decreased pay, and reduced benefits. In the paper’s first article on system 
privatization, the reporter summarized: “While in the early stages of discussion, the 
proposal has already caused a furor among city union officials who fear layoffs […]” 
(Fairbanks, 1996a). About 180 city employees hung in the balance if the public union 
contracts were terminated in order to create a private contract.  
The two-sided framing was almost completely consistent: in the period’s 65 
articles, city officials made direct or indirect comments in favor of privatization 71 times 
and negative or neutral comments 18 times; and union spokespeople and workers made 
negative comments about privatization 74 times and positive or neutral comments 11 
times. In contrast, direct or indirect quotations from non-water department worker, non-
governmental residents appear four times (three against and one in favor), further 
demonstrating the binary nature of the discourse, according to the paper’s account. 
Altogether there were 60 specific concerned comments about effects on employees or 
jobs from any actor, a small amount less than the 73 total references to lowered rates 
under private management. 
The press at this time commonly framed the opposition as an overzealous union 
voice which, if not checked, could inappropriately sway the administration’s decisions.  
An editorial predicted: “The Council could be a stumbling block to privatization. 
Lawmakers have been overly influenced by city-employee unions through the years to 
the detriment of the public” (“Private service,” 1997).  Union members, as they described 
the plan, would not suffer significantly during a transition, and would indeed have the 
opportunity to enter into new negotiations. Further espousing city talking points, Buffalo 
News editors pointed out that a shift to private management could be temporary; the 
contract, as they put it, was essentially a two- to five-year trial period. 
Where unions might contribute constructively to the conversation, the major 
newspaper implied, was in constructing a counter-proposal with equivalent savings 
(according to internal accounting methods). That is, almost immediately after 
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privatization ideas were brought to the table, it became the conceptualization of 
“progress” depicted as the default, with union voices given the option to present an 
“alternative,” according to the terms of this proposal. The same February 19 editorial 
piece opined: 
So far, so good. The city government must capture what savings it can for the 
sake of its citizens. 
But, based on past experiences, the Council could be a stumbling block to 
privatization. Lawmakers have been overly influenced by city-employee unions 
through the years to the detriment of the public. (“Private service,” 1997) 
Responding to a union request, a group of Common Council members led by 
Rosemarie LoTempio, Budget Committee chair, created a joint labor-management 
committee to investigate possibilities. The unions held that they could not participate in 
an examination of privatization options. Soon after, they pursued a court injunction to 
halt the city’s proposal review process. In March, about 150 union members joined a 
protest outside of City Hall against the proposal. 
Local news sources published the administration’s budget calculations repeatedly 
– such as their estimated savings of $3.7 million under private management. Throughout 
the phase, the idea of a private contract as a savings measure for the city was mentioned 
once every other article, on average. There were slight differences between the three 
proposals’ costs, but all accounts conveyed their substantial savings. Many articles 
framed the difference between current water system operations costs and projected costs 
under a contract as a savior for the budget. In one article, the reporter who covered most 
of the water management developments during this period wrote: “And what does the 
city stand to gain? About $14 million a year in savings if both water and sewer services 
are contracted out, according to one company. If the estimates prove correct, the savings 
would go a long way toward easing the ongoing fiscal crisis” (Fairbanks, 1997a). 
In many similar debates, researchers have documented that widely accepted cost 
benefit analyses are frequently incomplete. Sticking to a quantitative, fiscal analysis 
method, it is possible to reach an alternate conclusion on the benefits of a given public-
private initiative. Proponents of municipal service privatization, in some cases, have 
touted proposed contract costs in comparison with the standing costs of operations while 
omitting the continuing costs of maintaining a bureaucratic department to monitor the 
contract and hold the managing company accountable. They have also assessed the value 
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of some risks that the company will take on, while ignoring others. Some case studies 
reveal assumptions about a private company’s interest rates on loans being lower than 
those attainable by a government entity, a premise that is also disputable (Food and 
Water Watch, 2010, Appendix C; Sclar, 2000; Wolff, 2003). While an alternative cost 
benefit analysis for Buffalo’s contracting is beyond the scope of this paper, a review of 
media coverage does reveal a striking consistency to the quoted proposal savings 
estimates. The echo chamber of policy elites and the media, in this case, produced a 
virtually unchallenged savings figure, from a method that has been demonstrated to be 
inexact. 
In at least two instances, a stakeholder raised a specific piece of the contract, such 
that the total costs were called into question. The Water Board, for example, decided to 
investigate whether having a private operator would remove their requirement to pay the 
city a tax-like fee, then at about $5 million per year. It hired a consultant to look into the 
value of this fee to date. Notably, the newspaper mentioned this research and continued to 
quote the firms’ own contract estimates in subsequent articles without adjustment. 
Although the potential loss of this fee for the city raised a significant ambiguity in 
privatization cost projections, cost uncertainties continued to be omitted from the 
majority of media coverage. The centrally agreed upon savings estimate remained 
untouched. 
In addition to union members, other detractors included county-level stakeholders 
who were in favor of a city-county water management merger. This regionalism idea, 
which has come up repeatedly in the years both before and since the early privatization 
debates, held little sway with city decision makers at the time. Overseeing the largest 
concentration of Erie County’s potable water infrastructure, Buffalo officials had little 
incentive to engage in this parallel discussion.  Still, it did present an alliance opportunity 
for local contract naysayers. At the same time, the prospect of eventually selling their 
services to neighboring communities, and potentially expanding to sewage operations as 
well, was an important driving force behind the applicant firms’ interest in Buffalo; these 
companies saw lucrative long-term opportunities beyond Buffalo proper. 
Several residents were vocal on an individual basis – through letters to the editor 
and eventually at a public forum – about the potential risks and pitfalls of the private 
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operations plan. At least a few residents criticized he American Anglican contract on the 
grounds that the company was out-of-state, rather than local.  Some questioned the logic 
of user-paid water costs supporting profits for a company; one wrote in a letter to the 
editor:  
It makes no sense to this user for the city administration to choose to allow private 
management of the water operation that has always delivered quality water at a 
reasonable price. […] 
A private company will be seeking a profit and, due to the fact that the 
present bills are so low, there is a large margin for profit to be incorporated into 
the monthly billing. Also, I understand that the companies bidding for the rights 
to our water are foreign-owned, plan to bill monthly, purchase new equipment, 
invest millions into the system and install meters throughout the city. How is a 
profit-driven company going to make these changes and not raise rates? (Danahy, 
1997) 
Less visible at this stage in the discourse was the right-to-water language, already 
appearing in numerous developing countries’ water management discussions around the 
same time. One writer did verbalize the notion that clean water is a basic provision or 
“essential service,” writing that privatization may not be a “panacea,” but a “shortsighted 
solution to decades of mismanagement. While Mayor Masiello should not be held 
accountable for the mistakes of his predecessors, he is certainly responsible if he allows a 
private firm motivated by profit to treat water delivery as a commodity rather than the 
essential service it really is.” The same person also acknowledged some of the 
undesirable outcomes that residents of other cities had experienced under public-private 
water partnerships, noting that there was a “possibility that rates might increase. This has 
already happened in some communities where privatization has taken place” (“Let’s put,” 
1997). 
Some brought up the question of maintaining a system that is accountable to city 
dwellers’ needs and feedback. One resident wrote that staffing cuts will leave many 
Buffalo residents unemployed and added: “Almost as imperative, however, is the fact that 
the consumer will no longer be able to turn to elected officials to control costs of water 
service, maximizing the probability that water service will become more costly for 
Buffalo residents” (Ryan, 1997). A writer quoted above was explicit about the value of 
transparency during the proposal review process:  
If this [improving the performance of the current system] can't be done and the 
administration is truly convinced that privatization is the best route to follow, then 
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why isn't discussion on this issue more open? The administration should be 
holding public forums. Each proposal, in its entirety, should be made readily 
available for public scrutiny. (“Let’s put,” 1997) 
The occasional water user brought up how the impact of pricing changes would 
vary across class and other social stratifications; this complaint appeared twice in print. 
The writer who emphasized transparency also noted that, given the city’s average 
income, the city must examine “the impact metered rates would have on our poorest 
families.” A union member wrote to the editor with concerns about whether private 
management would continue to supply free water to public centers and specifically 
whether it would uphold the 40 percent rate discount the city extends to seniors 
(Rucinski, 1997). Overall, the rights, anti-corporate, accountability, and equity frames 
remained submerged during the first phase and did not demonstrate the power to mobilize 
the community around the issue. 
During the proposal review process, there were still some advocates for a regional 
system, or contract, in both the city and county decision-making circles. The new 
commissioner of the Erie County Water Authority, however, eventually made a statement 
against Buffalo’s privatization plans. He held that financing through bonds is more cost 
effective when directly managed by the public sector than by a private company. He also 
promoted engaging an outside researcher to examine city-county consolidation. 
A significant recurring theme in the media – and stated by all parties – was the 
matter’s urgency. With the end of the fiscal year approaching in June, the mayor’s team, 
unions, and residents alike recognized the need to pass a balanced budget quickly. On 
paper, this budget could include an in-house restructuring plan, an external water 
contract, or any number of other cost-cutting measures. In practice, however, research 
and steps towards privatizing the system’s operations had by then already moved much 
further than any other options on the table. Thus, time sensitivity soon became an 
argument in favor of building full support for a contract quickly, for the sake of the 
budget. During this phase overall, urgency was mentioned an average of more than once 
in every five articles. 
For Masiello, the city’s election cycle had to be a relevant factor as well.  As the 
contract gained attention – and garnered both positive and negative feedback – the 
months until the vote on his second term were diminishing.  On May 1, 1997, he released 
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the election-year budget, which reporter Phil Fairbanks wrote would: “hold the line on 
property taxes, cut water rates and endorse a historic privatization of the city’s water 
system” (1997b). His main election challenger that year was Council President James 
Pitts, the most outspoken person on the council in objecting to the mayor’s water 
management stances. In water policy, Pitts may have found a trademark issue with which 
to differentiate himself from his fellow Democrat. It is possible that this pushed Masiello 
to moderate his stance on the issue. 
After the Water Board’s approval in late April, union leaders still objected to the 
contract. They pursued a formal Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) complaint 
about the decision and the breaking of their own contracts. One leader, Paul DeFranks, 
represented a clear-cut view that any negotiation including a private contract was still not 
tenable for workers: 
He added that city officials are under a misconception if they think unionized 
workers will agree to privatizing their jobs. 
       “They believe that . . . now their only obligation to the union is to say, ‘Now 
you have to negotiate with a private contractor.’ It's not the contractor, it’s the 
concept that’s wrong,” he said. (Dolan, 1997) 
The PERB later filed an injunction to stall the contract, but the State Supreme Court 
turned down the request, finding that city officials had not shirked their obligation to 
negotiate with unions.  
Eventually, the unions sat down to a formal meeting with the city and all other 
major players and found a compromise. They reached an agreement to cooperate on 
looking into contract options, including a third-party study costing $15,000. The 
participants found genuine middle ground on several fronts, agreeing that all water 
employees would stay on the city payroll regardless of the final contract decision; in the 
absence of a signed contract with American Anglian, the union would agree to examine 
its work rules; and the Council would, at least temporarily, remove a 4% water rate hike 
from the budget in order to relieve the perceived pressure to shift to private management. 
This high level of engagement in decision making and shared ownership of outcomes 
reveals that the workers had bridged their experiences to the master frame of labor rights, 
in a way that was powerful enough to drive the community to action. Resident rights and 
equity remained submerged frames, however, in their perspectives and activities. 
54 
    
With less than a month left of the fiscal year, the city officially announced a 
proposed contract with American Anglian to commence potable water operation on July 
1, 1997.  On June 23, the city council held a hearing on the impending water management 
decision. The president of the local American Federation of State, County and Municipal 
Employees union, John Scardino, was one of the leading voices of the criticisms. His 
case was for minimal public employee layoffs. Following the hearing, only third-party 
engineer and other technical approvals remained. Officials and the press tended to 
describe these as obstacles to the July 1 implementation date. Indeed, the agreement had 
to be postponed, creating an unwanted window between the beginning of the city’s fiscal 
year and the onset of the contract. On July 23, 1997, the City Council voted on the five-
year contract with American Anglian and approved it 11-1, with the dissenting vote 
coming from Common Council Member at Large Beverly Gray. The Buffalo News 
largely praised the decision, writing: “the Council, in approving the water deal, ensured 
that water rates will drop by about 8 percent this year” (Fairbanks, 1997d).  
The rate decrease of eight percent was widely cited both during and after this 
round of debates. It is possible that, rather than a sign of long-term efficiency 
improvements, this simply signaled that the firm was willing to suffer a small loss on 
Buffalo in the contract’s early years, as part of its more substantial efforts to corner the 
water market throughout Western New York; some suggested this at the time. Indeed, 
while water rates dropped in the short term, new costs could be seen just around the bend, 
as a result of new, state-required water meters. Both city officials and the media tended to 
omit the effects that the meters might have on residential rates, even with the private 
contract. Just weeks before the lowered rate was set, a journalist describing the meters 
made the first Buffalo News acknowledgment that “the result will be higher bills for some 
users and lower bills for others” (Fairbanks, 1997c). 
The contract with American Anglian went into effect on September 1, 1997. 
Within two and a half years, the U.S. Conference of Mayors deemed the system a model 
for municipal public-private partnerships and awarded the City of Buffalo an Outstanding 
Achievement Award in recognition of this accomplishment. The Conference published a 
summary of the agreement process, commending its outcomes:  
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AmericanAnglian proposed annual fees producing an immediate savings of $4.4 
million per year. This saving was so significant that the City was not only able to 
avert a planned 12% rate increase, but it was able to reduce existing water rates by 
8%. In effect this was the equivalent of a 20% rate savings, or more than double 
the city’s original projection.  
AmericanAnglian proposed that all existing employees be retained by the 
City and be managed by AmericanAnglian. The agreement included no reduction 
in the employee’s current benefits or civil service status.  
Following the initial 8% rate reduction, rates have remained unchanged 
through 1999 and no increase is projected in the foreseeable future. (United States 
Conference of Mayors, 2000). 
 
Phase Two: To regionalize or not to regionalize? 
In the fall of 1999 American Anglian Environmental Technologies announced 
that the U.S. half of the bi-national agreement behind Buffalo’s water contract, American 
Water Works Co., had bought full control of the operation from its British partner, 
Anglian Water Plc. American Water Works became the sole firm managing the Buffalo 
water contract. American soon became a subsidiary of the German-based RWE-Thames 
water company, a relationship that lasted from 2001 to 2008. 
Within six months of the corporate management transition and within a month of 
the public-private partnership award from the U.S. Conference of Mayors, the company 
submitted complaints that the contract was not financially viable and a request for an 
adjusted, larger agreement. The five-year contract’s expiration was still more than two 
years way. According to the newspaper, the firm was running a loss because it “saw 
Buffalo as a foot in the door” and had wrongly predicted that it would be able to quickly 
obtain management deals with additional municipalities in the Western New York 
(Fairbanks, 2000). Without these, it no longer viewed its money-losing arrangement as 
viable. 
There was a substantial negative response to the early extension proposal. A 
significant number of articles cited examples of general worker, resident, and small 
business dissatisfaction. Common complaints – from individuals and some administrative 
leaders alike – related to collections practices and the new metering initiative. According 
to Anthony Hazzan, a leader in the Buffalo Sewer Authority (with which the Water 
Authority had partnered on collections administration), “There are a lot of problems. 
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Collections are upside down. The metering program is way behind schedule” (Fairbanks, 
2000).  
Several officials, including Mayor Masiello, remained positive about the public-
private arrangement. They pointed to the eight percent rate cut in the first year and 
constant general rates since. The Water Board chairperson noted that, among American’s 
contributions was the idea to raise rates in 1999 for only the heaviest water users, 
averting a 5.4 percent increase system-wide. An extended contract was a possibility, they 
reasoned, but future rate increases would have to be ruled out in writing. The city had 
incurred higher-than-usual system repair costs since American management began – $15 
million versus $2 million before the contract – meaning that a rate increase was 
increasingly likely. 
While statistically much less vocal in this period than in the first, the unions did 
have comprehensive concerns about worker morale. Much of the staff, according to the 
coverage at the time, felt that American had not kept its word on multiple occasions and 
it was disappointed in the company’s performance. One article quoted the president of the 
blue-collar union saying that he had not observed any improvements in the department’s 
operations since the contract’s start. Both in and out of the union, leaders were also 
critical of American’s track record in hiring, promoting, and retention of people of color. 
Two Black employees held management positions when the firm was first engaged; two 
and a half years later, there were no Black managers in the department’s employ. The 
vice chairperson of the Water Board noted that this statistic “raises concerns about their 
commitment to affirmative action” (Fairbanks, 2000). Before the contract’s start, Council 
Member Byron Brown (about 9 years before he would become mayor) had raised the 
issue of affirmative action in the department’s hiring and promotion protocol, noting that 
five of 180 water department employees were Black. He had successfully brought the 
issue into the original contract negotiations, but the company had not followed through 
with results three years later.  
Reports emerged before the Common Council and eventually in print that the 
mandatory meter installations required many residents, including senior and other low-
income individuals, to pay a thousand dollars or more in pipe replacements. Some 
experienced water shut-offs when they were unable to meet the new meter criteria. Still 
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others would face a choice between unexpected new water costs and fixing a leak that 
they never knew about, often for several hundred dollars. As a short-term solution, Byron 
Brown, the Council Member for the Masten neighborhood, allocated $25,000 of his block 
grant funds towards a revolving loan fund for constituents facing water emergencies. 
Eventually, the Common Council considered a broader grant or low-interest loan 
program and, alternatively, using legal tactics against the state. 
For the first time, local newspaper coverage included a cluster of mentions of the 
effects of the contract and the metering policy on those in the city who were at risk for 
being unable to pay necessary water-related costs. While during Phase One there were 
two mentions of the effects on low-income residents or other highly impacted 
demographics in 65 articles, in Phase Two there were 33 mentions in 90 articles, a more 
than tenfold ratio difference. Many of these references were to senior residents, who were 
billed according to a somewhat reduced water rate, but still had to pay associated costs. 
The majority of them related to payments associated with the mandatory meter 
installation initiative. 
Overall, the concerns raised during the decision-making processes of this period 
were similar to the first round in 1997: water rates, total costs for the city, and number of 
city jobs. As the city administration and council members discussed opportunities to 
partner with the county, unions, residents, and some city officials all referred to these 
issues, quoted in newsprint and at Common Council meetings and Water Board hearings. 
As the city struggled with a multimillion dollar debt that was projected to exceed $20 
million, mention of the need for revenue appeared even more frequently than in the first 
phase, more than one and a half times per article on average. Mentions of the contract’s 
effects of lowering rates decreased significantly, as that ceased to be a promise. At the 
same time, discourse on negative cost effects for ratepayers jumped up in this period: 
references to the history of or potential for heightened costs appeared over 1.6 times per 
article, more than seven times more frequently than in Phase One.  
The conversation on joining all or parts of the city and county systems had not 
entirely faded and, for many, the extension request was an opportunity to revisit the 
regional option. An editorial opined that a lengthened contract “may be worth 
considering if municipal leaders believe the firm is doing a good job, but no new deal 
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should be crafted without taking into account the need to consolidate the city and county 
water departments.” The same article listed several notable supporters of the idea: 
“County Executive Joel A. Giambra lists such a merger among his early priorities, and 
both City Hall and the county Water Authority also want to investigate the possibility” 
(Feb 20, 2000). According to another article, this push was an obstacle to the new 
contract that American was requesting, because “City Hall wants the authority to pursue a 
city-county merger, regardless of what happens with the company” (Fairbanks, 2000).  
Throughout this contract review period, the drive to consider regionalism in water 
service planning was a recurring theme. Discussion of a joint city-county arrangement 
had an appearance ratio of 1.3 in second phase articles, compared to less than 0.1 in the 
first phase and 0.5 in the third. Officials from the city’s administration were particularly 
vocal in supporting a merge, relative to both council members and residents. Others 
distanced themselves from the regional idea, concerned about potential higher costs or 
job loss in a unified system. Council members noted that suburban water users pay more 
than urban users, due to sprawl and larger delivery spans. Detractors also estimated that a 
merger would mean the loss of 54 city jobs; in response, members of the county 
government highlighted a plan to ensure new jobs for any laid off employees. Despite 
these reassurances, it looked to some like no proposed consolidation effort would 
ultimately benefit the city. The city’s budget director, a Water Board member, appeared 
in an article describing a city-county merge scenario: “Our costs would go up. […] That's 
not regionalism. That's stupid” (Meyer, 2002b). Opinion was divided. 
Because of competing political interests, neither a city-county merger nor an 
extended contract with American materialized immediately, but both remained on the 
table. At the beginning of 2002, the year the original contract was set to expire, the city’s 
finances were again coming up short, which led to a water rate increase. Metered rates 
and flat rates both rose, by 18.5 and 13.5 percent, respectively, in an unprecedented 
midyear decision. With no conclusion on a long-term contract renewal, the Common 
Council approved a brief extension to allow time for further debate.  
With the contract extension in hand, city officials embarked on a deliberate 
process to select and design its next long-term water contract. It received proposals from 
four enterprises, including an updated plan from American Water Services and a joint 
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regional concept from the Erie County Water Authority. While some supported the 
county water authority’s proposal, others did not see it as feasible in the short term. Many 
city officials promoted maintaining a relationship with the current operator, with the 
belief that a contract with a new company would make an eventual city-county merge 
more difficult.  
A new applicant had also incorporated a regional vision into its submission. As 
part of its “design-build-operate” proposal, the company U.S. Filter offered to pay 
Buffalo an upfront concession fee of $60 million and upgrade its water treatment plant. 
This was appealing to the city,. A portion of lawmakers, however, raised questions on the 
long-term viability of the proposed financial model, which also included regular city 
payments to the firm based on revenue from consumers. In addition, the deal would have 
required a change in state law. The proposal was a subject of hot debate among officials, 
leading to another contract extension with American, to allow time for a consulting firm 
to conduct a technical comparison of the bids. After several months of controversy over 
the potential merger – and only weeks after obtaining a new management deal with the 
nearby suburb of Tonawanda via referendum – the Erie County Water Authority offered 
the city $15 million to $20 million along with its operations proposal, framing it as an 
offset for the lost $5 million per year in revenue that Buffalo had been counting on 
receiving through the Water Department.  
At first, The Buffalo News’ editors had supported full consideration of the county 
executive’s plan, recommending that the city renew with American Water Services in 
order to have the time and ability to properly pursue a regional system. An editorial noted 
that a merger would be a “cost-saving, efficiency-boosting” solution (“Looking,” 2002). 
Like other supporters, the paper pointed to the county’s ability to invest in the city’s out-
of-date infrastructure. After the additional financial incentive in the county proposal and 
further inspection, however, the editors conceded that the city might lose money after the 
first few years. They wrote: “This page has long championed a regional agenda and the 
need to eliminate duplicative and expensive layers of government. But the city has raised 
reasonable questions about this deal, and the county authority either needs to quickly 
answer them, or improve its offer” (“The cost,” 2003). These questions included a 
complete analysis of the benefits of the $15 million upfront payment (taking into account 
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the added amount the city would have to pay for water to hydrants and the zoo), as well 
as changes to the city’s lower rates for senior citizens and for large commercial water 
users. 
Masiello turned down the county’s offer. In order to extend his team’s ability to 
mull over the available options, including another version of a regional approach, he 
suggested the Common Council approve one year of water management without any 
private firm engagement. A temporary return to government-run operations was not 
politically feasible, but policy makers approved two more brief extensions with American 
instead. They designed these to make room for negotiations with the firm on a new 5- to 
10-year contract, with significant emphasis on an early termination clause that would 
allow the city to back out of the contract given the opportunity to merge with the county 
system. With the decision, they moved away from an immediate deal with the county, but 
kept a window open for the future. In June 2003, the Water Board unanimously approved 
a new 5-year contract with American Water Services, with the exit clause to allow for 
system regionalization.1  
As balance sheets continued to be a major concern for the city and the Water 
Board, the department picked up the pace on its self-dubbed “aggressive” collections 
endeavors during this time period. American increased its attention to overdue payments 
and negotiating payment plans, as well as shutting off water service is some cases. A 
newer plan aimed to link delinquent payments with residents’ credit ratings. The Water 
Board returned to the issue of improving collections as the new 5-year contract was in its 
final stage of development. The board began considering transferring lasting water 
balances to property tax bills, where they would carry more weight, as well as filing liens 
against property owners with outstanding payments (Meyer, 2002a; Meyer, 2003).  
                                                       
1 A minor legal conflict during this period involved American’s monetary savings from 
energy conservation. The city sought $580,000 from the company, noting that part of 
their agreement was to divide all energy conservation savings in half. Eventually, they 
settled on a smaller payment outside of court. This episode garnered virtually no media 
coverage, nor did American’s detractors emphasize it. Nonetheless, it is indicative of the 
challenges that cities with public service contracts can face in maintaining agreements. 
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Over time, the company’s ramped up collections enforcement was measurable. In 
December 2002, American Water had disconnected service at 20 city sites where 
residents had overdue bills; in December 2003, it disconnected about 377. Until early 
2004, any mention of shut-offs in The Buffalo News related to the redoubled collections 
efforts, which were framed as sorely needed. For the first time, coverage in early 2004 
offered a negative framing; it announced that a “Water Shut-off Blitz Leaves Some High 
and Dry” and quoted a Water Division employee who had observed social favors leading 
to “uneven” use of water service termination as a collections enforcement tool. 
As was the case with the financial burdens of meter installation requirements, the 
vast majority of early complaints on late payment policies and foreclosures related to the 
experiences of senior residents. During discussions of new rate increases in 2001, a group 
of activists gathered outside City Hall to give voice to residents who could not bear the 
burden of further costs. Rosa Gibson, a resident of the Masten Park neighborhood, and 
her group Community Action Information Center led the charge in advocating for water 
affordability and rights during this period. She told a reporter, “Where will people on 
fixed incomes get the extra money? I don’t care if it’s only $2 more a year. People – 
especially seniors – can’t afford higher fees” (quoted in Meyer, 2001). At a Water Board 
hearing soon after, another resident said of the proposed rate increases, “Every time you 
mismanage the funds, you fall on the backs of the citizens of this town. It’s not fair to me 
as a single parent, struggling every day” (quoted in Cardinale, 2001). 
In the general media coverage leading up to the renewed 5-year contract, 
however, the discourse focused on the pros and cons of a city-county deal, the optimal 
way to design such a contract, and the means of getting to one. Even after the contract 
renewal, the regional discourse remained strong; one post-renewal article, entitled 
“Merger is Near for Water Services,” outlined continuing dialogues between the mayor 
and the county executive in detail. At this time, the experiences and concerns of residents 
– particularly low-income residents – remained almost completely off of the mainstream 
radar and out of negotiations. One council member, Marc Coppola, had a specific 
alternative proposal to system regionalization – keeping the city’s assets and selling 
rights to bottle purified water from the system – which had little support and never came 
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to fruition. Alternative revenue-producing ideas like this were rare during the second 
period. 
After the contract renewal, city experts were still predicting a $2.8 million 
shortfall in the current fiscal year, if no corrective measures were taken. Their framing of 
the situation was expressed frequently and clearly: the city’s budget challenges were 
urgent and dire. References to the need for a timely water management solution remained 
significant in the second phase, at more than one in four articles, on average. As reasons 
for its budgetary woes, the Water Board cited population loss, a wet summer, owed 
payments, and increased overdue collections costs. American Water noted that it had 
already made concessions, pointing out that it had reduced its staff size by just under a 
quarter between 1997 and 2003 (Fairbanks, 2003). The push to trim costs was not over 
for the water department. 
A series of decisions that followed sparked increasing resident reactions, 
generally negative. Resident quotation rates, direct and indirect, grew from about one in 
25 articles in the first phase, to more than one in five in the first half of Phase Two and 
more than two in five in the second half. This marked the early formation of a submerged 
frame on the right to water – one to which only a few residents bridged their experiences. 
Months after the new contract with American was sealed, the Water Board voted to 
increase rates again in January 2004, making a significantly greater leap than in the past 
with 22.9% and 20.4% increases for metered rates and flat rates, respectively. (The Erie 
County Water Authority’s budget for that year also included a rate jump, but a much 
smaller one.) A small group protested this decision inside City Hall at a hearing. Gibson, 
among others, spoke before the board: “My question is, six months from now, will there 
be another increase? Being on a fixed income, how could most of us afford that?” (quoted 
in Pignataro, 2003). Because of an old clause that apparently surprised many council 
members, these rate changes were set to have retroactive ramifications for some, 
affecting bills for the last three months of the prior year. Still more residents expressed 
dissatisfaction. The newspaper quoted a West Side homeowner reflecting, “It’s not a 
question of money; it's a question of fairness,” and at least one council member who 
agreed (Fairbanks, 2003). Eventually, a credit was instated for those who had incurred 
retroactive charges. 
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The Water Board continued to struggle with its costs and, in March 2004, it 
passed the year’s third rate increase to go into effect on July 1, set at 4%. Once again, 
residents were outraged by the rate change, appearing in print and in person in even 
greater numbers than before. A short blurb in a Saturday paper announced that the leader 
of a Baptist congregation was urging his parishioners to oppose the latest rate increase via 
petitions and the scheduled public hearing; this community organizing announcement 
marked another Buffalo News first on the issue (“Parishioners,” 2004). The hearing itself 
sparked the engagement of an unprecedented number of residents – over 100 – many of 
whom were the church’s congregants. 
Common Council members were receiving a barrage of calls from their 
constituents as well. Quickly, they criticized the plan and pursued an audit of the Water 
Board. One member of the council raised the issue of accountability to the public, “noting 
that the Council no longer has authority over rates” and blaming the 1997 system 
privatization decision (Meyer, 2004a). Four members teamed up to propose early 
termination of the contract with American Water, a resolution that the council placed 
before the mayor. An outside party became involved when a state senator requested that 
the state comptroller’s office conduct an audit of the rate increases and the effects of 
privatizing the system. Council members and the commissioner of public works pressed 
the Water Board to delay the increase, but were ultimately unsuccessful. The late-March 
public hearing turned out to be symbolic; board member and City Finance Commissioner 
James Milroy made it clear that resident feedback that day would not impact the vote, 
which authorized the rate increase. 
As this additional spring rate change was pending, buzz was also increasing again 
on the potential for a city-county deal. Ongoing negotiations had led to a memorandum of 
understanding, which Mayor Masiello and County Executive Giambra were poised to 
sign, for an asset sale of the city water system to the Erie County Water Authority. Under 
the contract, the regional water authority would pay Buffalo $31.5 million over six years 
and make up to $15 million in repairs to the city system per year. Proponents pointed out 
that the county would also take on over $120 million in city water system debt. Other 
promises included smaller and less frequent rate increases – particularly compared to the 
status quo – and reduced system costs overall. Large-volume commercial users, a class 
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including hospitals and manufacturing plants, would continue to pay lower rates. Seniors, 
on the other hand, would see their discounts gradually wind down. 
The agreement needed buy-in from the Water Board; the Common Council; 
citizens of Buffalo, via a referendum; the state; and the public unions. Right away some 
union leaders denounced the deal. In addition to the two government heads, the chair of 
the Erie County Water Authority, Mark Patton, supported the terms. The negotiation 
team made some assurances that it would help affected workers find new employment, 
but the water authority had been clear that job cuts were a piece of its efficiency tactic. In 
addition, at least two labor heads questioned the long-term financial benefit to the city. 
One council member advocated for a request for proposals and a comprehensive 
comparison of offers, including the county’s. Amidst the discussions, the city comptroller 
released an audit of the water system, giving it fairly high scores on efficiency. It did 
bring attention to the large rate increases in recent years and also made a recommendation 
to improve reporting on overdue bills.2 With regard to the merger, the report urged the 
city to bring on a consultant before signing the deal, to ensure that the “interests of the 
city taxpayers are protected” (quoted in Meyer, 2004b). 
Members of both the Water Board and the Common Council remained 
unconvinced for several months that the regionalist deal would benefit city residents, but 
the Water Board eventually signed on to the memorandum of understanding. It also voted 
to formally request a referendum through the council, but council members were not 
swayed. Most said they would require more information to definitively assess the 
financial benefit to the city and to answer questions about the phase-out of senior 
discounts and other details. Several detractors noted that Buffalo’s water system was a 
major asset to the city and believed that excess water, not the system itself, should be 
sold. A dissenting Water Board member, Patrick Wesp, said at a public forum, “It’s not a 
sale. The City of Buffalo isn’t getting anything for it. We’re giving away the pipes, the 
treatment plant, everything we own… This deal is wrong. They’re not paying enough for 
                                                       
2 In response to the audit, a council member (quoted in the newspaper) noted the 
coincidence of the steady-rate and rate decrease years with Masiello’s election cycle. 
This quickly became a mantra among policy makers justifying present-day rate increases. 
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the assets” (Lindstedt, 2004). Having significant unanswered questions about the 
financial merit of the pact and other issues, the Common Council effectively blocked its 
passage. 
Not long after the Water Board moved to support the merger, it began to consider 
a mid-year rate increase of 30%, a move that some council members labeled as an 
attempt to “strong-arm” them into agreeing to the county deal (Meyer, 2004d). When this 
increase was on the table, the public again reacted vehemently. Complaints increasingly 
turned to the system’s lack of accountability to voters. A group of residents joined forces 
to advocate for the termination of the Water Board’s tenure. The Buffalo News quoted 
Samuel A. Herbert, of the East Side, “There is absolutely no accountability – there’s no 
system of checks and balances… It's time to dissolve the [Water Board] and have the city 
make the decisions” (Meyer, 2004c). Some council members agreed and placed before 
their colleagues a bill that would dissolve the Water Board and empower the Common 
Council to set rates; it was sent to committee, where it stayed. The Water Board finally 
settled on a lower rate increase for January 2005 of 10%, but negative feedback from 
residents did not subside. 
 
Phase Three: Finding a solution to address residents’ needs 
Public administration experts in and out of the city continued to hold up the 
Buffalo contract as a model, because of its savings and efficiency accomplishments. In 
2005, the National Council for Public-Private Partnerships recognized American Water 
Services and the City of Buffalo for their achievement. By the association’s measures, the 
partnership had saved the city $21 million in operational and financial savings over six 
years. American’s press release listed some of the contract’s successes: “the complete 
automation of customer records, the design and construction of a brand new customer 
service center, the procurement of new vehicles and repair contracts and a new 
computerized maintenance and management system” (American). 
Still, the Water Board’s budgetary challenges continued to arise like clockwork. 
The need to close city budget gaps continued to arise an average of more than once per 
reviewed article in this phase. As the Water Board and city government made changes to 
save costs throughout this period, there was a repeated pattern of resident backlash and a 
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strong trend of increasing coverage of resident-oriented concerns with the contract. 
Negative impacts on residents, including rates and fees, appeared at a rate of more than 
one and a half times per article, with an higher number of negative and pro-resident 
quotations than previous phases coming from Common Council members. 
The 2005 mayoral race brought little attention to water management issues, but 
regionalism stances were part of the discussion. The candidates – Council Member Byron 
Brown, a Democrat, and Kevin Helfer, a Republican – both supported regional service 
consolidations as efficiency measures, at least in theory. On the immediate issue of joint 
water operations, Helfer declared support for the county water authority’s offer to buy the 
city system, while Brown criticized the idea of the city selling these assets, supporting the 
sale of water only. For most voters in this strongly Democratic-leaning city, though, this 
was a minor aspect of the candidates’ platforms. Brown was elected and took office in 
2006, signaling a major contextual shift of the third phase of contract discourse. 
Attempting to find more ways to realize its revenue projections, the Water Board 
had begun discussing in early 2004 the possibility of linking long-time outstanding water 
payments to homeowners’ property tax bills. This would give the city the ability to place 
liens on properties with debt, giving it substantially more weight in collecting the 
payments. At the end of the year, the city implemented its plan, beginning with 
foreclosure notices for 12,000 residents who were a year or more behind on garbage fees. 
Over 4,000 homeowners who had year-long water service debt and no payment plan 
received similar letters; they would have about nine months to pay off the bills plus a 
$439 “foreclosure fee.” 
Some lawmakers and officials made a point of showing that they would be “hard 
on delinquent payers.” During prior debates about rate hikes, a couple council members 
had noted that overdue payments were making increases necessary, which infuriated 
many residents who were paying on time and felt that the system was penalizing them for 
others’ failure to pay. As a result, particular members began conveying that foreclosure 
warnings are necessary because late payers “have to be taught a lesson” (Lindstedt, 
2004).  
Others on the council, however, observed the challenges presented by these policy 
changes. They reflected that some of their constituents may have difficulties paying off 
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their bills in the allotted time of under a month, before incurring the additional 
foreclosure fee, another financial burden. They also noted that many owners never knew 
about their debt, such as in cases where notices were sent to a vacant property. These 
representatives pushed for a more lenient initial response date before the fee set in, but 
met with substantial opposition. The new collections efforts went into effect and the 
following year water officials were pointing to the change’s successes; they calculated 
that the authority had brought in $2.1 million more than projected, including revenue 
from the city’s first water bill-related foreclosure auction in 2005 (Meyer, 2006a). 
A new report released around this time revealed that about 40% of Buffalo’s 
water, or about 12 billion gallons per year, was lost through leaks and malfunctions, with 
another 5 billion gallons lost from privately owned pipes. The pressing need for 
infrastructure repairs continued to be a widely cited reason for policy changes coming 
from all sides of the debate. Reflecting both heightened need and heightened awareness 
of that need, the rate of mentions of aging and broken infrastructure climbed steadily 
through the three phases, from an average of two times in ten articles to over four to 
almost six. This added further pressure to increase the department’s revenue in order to 
fund repairs and capital projects. 
Another bout of resident engagement on water management ensued when the 
Water Board announced its fiscal year 2005-2006 rate increase: an estimated 10%. 
Common Council members and residents both expressed concerns. According to the 
paper, “a community activist said opposition to another rate hike is so intense that there's 
talk of setting up pickets outside the homes of Water Board members or exploring legal 
action” – a significant step in coordination and mobilization from earlier levels of 
organizing. Council Member James Griffin observed: “The people out there are really fed 
up with what’s happening… People want to know when this is going to end” (Meyer, 
2005a).  Turnout to the relevant hearing, however, was in the single digits. This period 
revealed the further development of a homeowners’/renters’ rights frame, which had 
begun to form during the second phase, but the frame’s ability to mobilize the community 
remained low. 
68 
    
The debate among policy makers centered around two beliefs: that a rate change 
should be held pending a consultant’s recommendation and that the city’s financial 
situation was too dire to delay a revenue solution. 
The Water Board faced more pressure Tuesday to delay next month’s vote on a 
possible rate increase.  
The Common Council unanimously called on water officials to hold the 
line on rates until studies can be completed, including an independent rate 
analysis. But the city's finance commissioner warned that delaying action on rates 
for several months could be harmful to the water system.  
“We don’t have the luxury to wait, because we have an obligation to meet 
legal obligations to our bond holders,” said James B. Milroy, who sits on the 
Water Board. “We could find the water system in default, and that would be the 
worst thing that could happen.” (Meyer, 2005b) 
Some also linked the water rate change to a virtually simultaneous sewer rate hike, 
heightening reactions. Briefly, this sparked brainstorming on possible administrative 
consolidation between the sewer and water departments. After much discussion, a 7.5% 
increase was passed. Later in the year, the Buffalo Water Finance Authority utilized a 
refinancing option as another means of managing its multimillion-dollar debt.  
The Water Board was able to pass a budget with no rate adjustment during Mayor 
Brown’s first year in office – a feat that it had not accomplished for several years – but it 
continued conversations on potential rate restructuring over the coming five to ten years. 
The topics of a that study the board commissioned at this time reveal its priorities: how 
ratepayers could be minimally affected, how affordability could be ensured for low-
income seniors and others, and how large-scale commercial water users would be 
impacted by potential changes. Historically, industrial users had received a substantial 
discount because of the quantity and consistency of their use. In the beginning of the new 
fiscal year, the Water Board broached the topic of raising rates for high-volume users. All 
nine council members, in a symbolic endorsement, supported the measure. Since they had 
concerns about meeting revenue needs while upsetting the fewest possible voters, raising 
businesses’ rates was apparently a political win-win for both bodies. The board passed an 
18% increase (in two stages) for large industrial users and an 8% increase for residential 
users for the following year. 
Many board and council members saw the industrial rate restructure as a question 
of equity, a notable evolution in rate structure framing. The critique from the business 
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community was light, according to the local paper, and the “everyman” attitude prevailed 
among policymakers. Council Member Bonnie E. Russell reflected, “There comes a time 
when you have to start being pro-resident. You can't always worry about big business. 
Someone has to start paying attention to residents” (quoted in Meyer, 2006b). Several of 
her colleagues agreed: 
“The industrial large volume customers aren’t paying their fair share,” said 
Harold J. Smith, vice president of Raftelis Financial Consultants, a North Carolina 
firm that has been reviewing water rates. “This has really increased the cost 
burden on the residential customers.”  
Water Board member Charles E. McGriff, who has opposed some past 
rate increases, said he's leaning in favor of supporting a plan that he thinks would 
redistribute costs more equitably.  
“It's only fair that the larger customers pay rates that reflect our costs of 
doing business,” he said. (July 13, 2006) 
The newspaper echoed this attitude; in a two-sentence synopsis of the Common Council 
meeting, reporter Brian Meyer wrote that it “unanimously endorsed restructuring water 
rates to ease the burden on residential customers by reducing discounts for high volume 
industrial and commercial users” (2006c). This emphasis on pro-resident solutions 
characterized the third phase, in contrast to the earlier discourse. 
In another effort to seek out lost revenue, the Water Board began to crack down 
on “water piracy,” or off-the-books, illegal hookups to the city system. Over a thousand 
city properties were known to have unofficial water connections, with the number 
constantly rising. The previous summer, American Water had undertaken a savings 
project to reduce the incidence of open hydrants. Now water officials were working with 
the Police Department and the county district attorney’s office to arrest and prosecute for 
water theft. They beefed up investigations of supposedly vacant properties that were not 
on billing lists. The team also started a public campaign urging residents to look for signs 
of theft and sending them to a designated hotline with tips.  
Individuals who were found guilty of water theft could be charged with a felony 
and receive a sentence of up to four years in prison. Regardless of the legal proceedings, 
they would also face hundreds – in many cases, thousands – of dollars of accumulated 
service fees. For some, water reconnection would be contingent upon the initial payment 
of some of this debt. A top American employee noted that about one-third of the city’s 
water budget was devoted to collections and related work, endeavors that he assessed 
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were worthwhile. Between 2003 and 2006, the city brought in $14.5 million from 
customers who had previously had their service shut off. As of August 2006, about 6,000 
residents were on payment plans to pay off debt. 
If news coverage of the water services’ complaints about residents was ramping 
up, so was coverage of residents complaints about their water service. By late 2006, a 
significant number of water users were outraged over the limited customer service and 
long wait times for repairs they had experienced with the city. The Buffalo News drew a 
direct correlation: “Catching water pirates is important, some callers said, but they argued 
that providing adequate service to good-paying customers is equally important” (Meyer, 
2006d). While many bill-paying residents saw the piracy problem as a tragedy of the 
commons leading to higher rates for those who paid, there was at least as much 
dissatisfaction with the company’s own performance. 
Department statistics showed that about 2,800 of 9,900 calls during a 17-day 
period in mid-2006 had been processed. Customers spent an average of 40 minutes 
waiting when they called, with many on hold for longer. The mayor echoed resident 
complaints emphatically, formally telling American Water: “You guys got two weeks to 
come back with some type of plan” (quoted in Meyer, 2006e). The problems were both 
related to quality of service – many customers called seeking repairs – and collections. Of 
those who called about bills or payment plans, at least 70% gave up before speaking to a 
representative. For the city, this highlighted not only a failure in meeting residents’ 
standards, but also one of efficient revenue processing.  
At the Water Board meeting that finalized a business-only rate increase for 
January 2007, customer service complaints were a central topic. Samuel Herbert, a 
politically active Buffalonian, pushed the board to curb “runaway rate increases” for 
residents in the long term. Former Council Member Alfred Coppola (then running for 
State Senate) also criticized the public-private partnership’s commitment to 
accountability; referring to the meeting he was attending, he said, “It’s unconscionable it 
was held during the workday. They obviously don't want to be criticized for their poor 
performance” (quoted in Meyer, 2006f). Just two months after issuing his harsh warning, 
Mayor Brown’s administration celebrated the remedial steps that American had taken. 
Phone wait times had been cut dramatically, recording systems provided more useful 
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information to customers, and the company added an Internet-based payment option. City 
officials seemed impressed with the turnaround. 
Still, critiques of the system operator were not completely quelled. Just weeks 
after the mayor’s praises, new reporting revealed that some customers were being 
charged late fees despite punctual payment, due to a lag time in the system. Typically, 
these charges were small, but they had likely affected hundreds of people over two or 
more years. Complaints like this were beginning to accumulate. In contrast to a 0.2 
appearance ratio in the first phase, the cons of private management for ratepayers – 
including rate increases, fees, shut-offs – appeared more than one and a half times per 
article in the second and third phases. Resident engagement overall and its coverage 
increased as well: direct and indirect resident quotations appeared at a rate of more than 
0.7 in the phase’s 50 articles, up from one-third in the previous phase’s articles. 
The mayor, too, was personally engaged in mitigating negative effects of water 
management decisions on residents. Once he had settled into his post, Byron Brown took 
on a cost issue that carried much starker consequences for many residents and that had 
affected him personally, as a resident: mandatory infrastructure repairs that the 
department considered the responsibility of homeowners. Many of these hovered around 
$5,000 or more and were prohibitively expensive for the city’s water users. The mayor’s 
proposal was to offer an insurance policy, or “protection plan,” for five or six dollars a 
month, which would commit American Water Service to covering any out-of-building 
system repair costs on the customer’s property. He began to work with the company on a 
remedy for high and unavoidable repair costs.  
Reactions to home tax liens and foreclosure policies, on the other hand, were 
neither heavily published nor well organized at first. One of the only cases that The 
Buffalo News initially reported on was an administrative error that had landed a 
foreclosure notice with a known historic site. For a variety of reasons, residents with 
large amounts of water debt were either unable to publicly critique the city’s policies or 
fearful of the consequences. Opinions like this one, expressed in a letter to the editor 
dated October 19, 2005, were extremely rare before 2007. Foreshadowing the movement 
to come, city resident Sandra Carrubba wrote: 
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Later this month, the City of Buffalo will foreclose on almost 2,000 owner-
occupied homes because of unpaid water bills or user fees. People will be thrown 
out on the street; some because catastrophic illness caused them to lose both jobs 
and health insurance and, thus, fall behind on their financial obligations. Elderly 
people who have occupied the same house for decades need help managing their 
meager finances.  
The Seneca Nation will soon own city land tax-free forever. Developers 
receive taxpayer dollars to build downtown housing. The Bass Pro [corporate 
development] handout will be in the millions. Yet there is no help or 
accommodation for people who have kept neighborhoods stable? City 
government leaders prefer acting as a collection agency for the private company 
that runs the water system. (2005) 
 While publicity levels may have been low, property liens and foreclosures related 
to water bills were continuing at a steady clip. In late 2007, staff at the Legal Aid Bureau 
of Buffalo began to see a pattern in a portion of their clients’ complaints. Housing 
attorney Sherree Meadows was representing several individuals who had racked up more 
debt than they were able to pay and risked foreclosure – some of the same people 
Carrubba had written about two years earlier. Meadows and her colleagues saw a trend 
among these discrete cases and began to work to empower clients to speak out and 
advocate for changes collectively, at the city policy level (M. Pacifico, personal 
communication, August 18, 2008). This level of mobilization signifies the local 
movement’s bridging of resident experiences to homeowners’/renters’ rights as a master 
frame; while organizers also evoked the environmental justice frame, it remained 
submerged during this phase. 
By February 2008, Water Board officials had heard enough to place a one-year 
moratorium on foreclosures for long-term water debt. During that period, the board 
embarked on a complete review of its collections processes. (Foreclosures continued 
according to city policy for overdue payments of two years or more on property taxes, 
sewer payments, and garbage fees.) Acting Public Works Commissioner Steven Stepniak 
claimed that the suspension was related to potential billing inaccuracies, which he traced 
back to a system change nine years prior. Still, Meadows deemed it an important step – 
and continued to push forward on late fee policy. 
The Legal Aid Bureau estimated that thousands of Buffalo residents were facing 
water bills that presented them with a significant fiscal hardship. Meadows pointed out 
that those with overdue payments past 120 days were charged a 21% commission plus an 
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additional 18.5% annual interest rate, calling it “interest on interest” (quoted in Meyer, 
2008b). The Legal Aid Bureau worked with many seniors and other low-income water 
users for whom these fees meant bills that were impossible to pay off. Speaking to the 
Water Board, resident Catherine Harris, for instance, described the large bill she had 
taken on from her late mother: “It never really goes down. I just can’t catch up.” 
Meadows estimated that, for some water users, late fees and interest constituted 38% of 
their outstanding balance. A chief public works engineer called these fees in accordance 
with “industry standards” (Meyer, 2008a). 
Appearing with a group of residents, Meadows also explained to the water 
officials that – unlike gas and electric services – customers whose water had been shut off 
were required to fill out a form in order to stop additional water charges from 
accumulating; the system default was to continue charging after shut-off. This additional 
step, of which many were unaware, led to further debt amassing in the accounts of people 
who were already having trouble making payments. 
As complaints were escalating into community organizing, rate hikes were also 
ceasing to be the norm. For the third year in a row, the Water Board approved a budget 
with no change to residential charges. This trend also coincided with the end of American 
Water Services’ second five-year contract. In the spring of 2008, board members and 
council members began to gear up for discussions on another major contract renewal. 
Council Member Michael LoCurto of the city’s Delaware district had heard Meadows’ 
and his constituents’ concerns and became vocal, during extension discussions among his 
colleagues, on the issue of interest rates and fees. At one meeting, he asserted, “I don’t 
know if we should be running city services like a credit card company. I think you might 
be able to get better rates from a loan shark” (quoted in Meyer, 2008c). Council Member 
Michael Kearns shared some of his colleagues’ questions on Water Division policies and 
their effects on residents. Beyond late fees, Kearns wanted to address water shut-offs and 
the practice of continuing to charge for water after discontinuing service (M. Kearns, 
personal communication, August 26, 2008). 
When the Common Council held a public hearing to inform the upcoming 
contract decision, numerous residents with tales of negative water system experiences 
attended and spoke. One resident and owner described her cancer diagnosis and medical 
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bills, and the decision she had made to sell possessions in order to pay off her water 
balance, which, nonetheless, was not decreasing significantly. Another resident described 
a neighboring household with a turned off water account, in which the children were 
bathed using a bucket of water each day. (In cases like this, residents in other parts of the 
U.S. have disclosed a fear of seeking redress, keenly aware of the possibility that child 
protective services may intervene before water could be restored [Miller, 2007]). 
The Buffalo News’ coverage became gradually more sympathetic to the stories of 
low-income residents between Phases One and Two and Phase Three, moving slightly 
from coverage of residents taking advantage of the system towards coverage of the 
system taking advantage of residents. The trend is demonstrated in a 2008 article’s 
opening paragraphs: 
Buffalo homeowners who have fallen behind in paying water bills told horror 
stories Tuesday about struggles to keep their taps from running dry. 
Speakers who attended a City Hall hearing said many people who owe 
mounting water bills are not deadbeats who scheme to cheat the system. Instead, 
they're single mothers, elderly residents on fixed incomes and low-income 
individuals who make a choice between buying food and catching up on water 
bills. (Meyer, 2008d) 
For Meadows, LoCurto, Kearns, and many voters, these were key issues in the 
pending decision on American’s contract. One of their proposed solutions was to sign 
onto only a six-month or one-year agreement, but many government officials dissented. 
The acting public works commissioner, in particular, wanted to investigate the questions 
on the table, but advocated for a fully renewed contract in the short term, in order to 
maintain consistent service. He pointed out the inclusion of a termination clause that 
allowed the city to end the contract with 90 days’ notice.3 
To address the recurring complaints he had heard from constituents, Council 
Member Kearns composed a “Water Ratepayers Bill of Rights” to accompany the new 
contract extension. The document outlined processes for responding to and documenting 
                                                       
3 By 2007, a collection of infrastructure problems, several member changes, and related 
political turmoil on the Erie County Water Authority had led to some calling for its 
complete restructuring or dissolution. Implicitly, city officials put any plans they were 
still cultivating to merge with county services on hold indefinitely. 
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complaints. It also changed the practice of continuing to bill residents for water after 
service termination. The Common Council approved a two-year extension of the contract, 
including Kearns’ addendum, with LoCurto casting the only objecting vote. LoCurto 
explained, “There are too many problems and some service issues” and noted that he 
might have agreed to six months longer with American (quoted in Meyer, 2008e). 
With the Common Council’s stamp of approval, the Water Board moved forward 
with the new contract. The board, however, was not obligated to enforce the Bill of 
Rights. Quoted in the same newspaper article, the chair acknowledged the resident 
protection terms: “We’re obviously going to take their ideas into consideration.” 
 
Epilogue: Contract termination 
Immediately following the contract extension, Standard and Poor’s raised the 
Buffalo Municipal Water Finance Authority’s credit rating two levels, to an ‘A.’ The 
2008 financial crisis followed soon after, though, hitting the city’s accounts as it did 
across the country. The water authority’s debt interest rates took a dramatic jump, but 
ratepayers were spared the effects at first. 
Throughout the 2008-2010 leg of American Water’s engagement in Buffalo, the 
same types of complaints from across the city’s sectors continued to emerge as earlier. 
Many residents and business owners were concerned about rates, which eventually rose 
to counteract a shrinking customer base, as well as customer service records. Without 
implementation mechanisms built in, the Water Ratepayers Bill of Rights, only partially 
addressed the high late fees and department’s shut-off policies. 
Soon, policy makers brought up new types of contracts to consider at the 
conclusion of the two-year deal with American Water Services. The Common Council 
and Water Board eventually approved a new with Veolia, a company based in France that 
had committed to a high level of customer service standards at to be enforced by fines. 
The new agreement also included a version of Kearns’ Bill of Rights, to further ensure 
that operations would remain transparent. It eliminated the high commission for late 
payments that American had charged and shifted all billing tasks back to city offices. 
Veolia was expected to hire a handful of staff directly, but over 100 positions in the water 
department were filled by public employees. The cost of the new deal was just over $5 
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million per year, 10 percent less than the city’s prior arrangement. When the Common 
Council approved the contract, Richard Fontana, the majority leader, filed the only 
dissenting vote; he believed that a consultant could have helped the city develop a plan to 
run the system more efficiently without a management firm. The Veolia contract will be 
up for review in 2020. 
 
Table 4-1. 
Fiscal year1 Rate change for most 
households 
 Flat; metered rate 
change, where different 
Historical benchmarks 
1992-1993 +11.8%2 Water Board formed 
1993-1994 +12.9% Election (Masiello enters office Jan. 1994) 
1994-1995 + 9.4%  
1995-1996 + 6.9%  
1996-1997 + 1.0%  
1997-1998 -  8.0% First American Anglian contract; Re-election 
1998-1999 No change  
1999-2000 No change  




+ 13.5%;  + 18.5%  
Re-election; 
Meter installation begins 








+  4.0% 
+ 10.0% 
 
2005-2006 +  7.5% Election (Brown enters office Jan. 2006) 
2006-2007 No change Jan.2007: Business rates increased 2-5% 
2007-2008 No change   
2008-2009 No change  
1 Most rate changes went into effect with the new fiscal year budget, beginning on July 
1st. When a mid-year rate change was passed, the date the new rate when into effect is 
noted. 
2Alternate calculation: +14.5% 
Source: The Buffalo News, various articles 
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Table 4-2. Rate of mentions (mentions per article reviewed) of major topics, 
justifications, and critiques during each of three phases. 
Phase 1 2 3 
Dates 1996 – 
Dec 1999 
Jan 2000 – 





Arguments Rate of mentions, as average number 
of argument mentions per 10 articles 
Need for savings for city (any 
solution) 
12 18 13 15 
Savings for ratepayers (of private 
contract or regional contract) 
11 5 4 6 
Right to water, generally < 1 < 1 1 <1 
Accountability, generally 3 2 1 2 
Efficiency of market  1 < 1 < 1 <1 
Jobs quality and quantity 9 2 1 4 
Regional approach < 1 13 5 7 
Negative impacts on water users 
(high rates, fees, foreclosures, etc.) 
2 17 15 12 
Negative impacts on low-income 
water users and/or senior water 
users, in particular 
< 1 4 4 3 
 













Lessons from Buffalo 
“The biggest problem with water is the waste of water through lack of 
charging.” – James Wolfensohn, President, World Bank, 2000 (Frontline 
World, 2002) 
 
“Is it possible to have private water work right? […] I'm sure it is. But if you 
have a political problem in your city, you can vote in a new administration. If 
you have a private company with a long-term contract, and they’re the source 
of your problems, then it gets a lot more difficult.” – Gordon Certain, 
neighborhood association leader, Atlanta (Jehl, 2003) 
 
The case of Buffalo, New York’s water management debates between 1996 and 
2008 sheds light on the broader, international discourse evolving at the same time. This 
case study reveals common reasons cited for and against private management, trends of a 
series of management decisions over time, and the evolution of stakeholders’ frames as a 
contract progressed. While proponents of private management rarely referred to a 
neoliberal frame directly (e.g. the universal primacy of the market) and proponents of 
public management rarely referred to a right-to-water, water justice, or environmental 
justice frame directly, they nonetheless typified these broader belief systems in their 
actions, arguments, and values. This research outcome points to the presence of 
submerged frames and supports a widened definition of the supporters of both water 
privatization and the universal right to water.  
Throughout Buffalo’s contract debates, the city’s budgetary constraints or savings 
were the most common reason cited to make the case for, and sometimes against, private 
management. In the more than 200 articles analyzed, speakers and writers used savings 
for the city as an argument about one and a half times per article, on average. Customer 
rates were also referenced frequently and consistently in all of the discussions. The 
promise of lowered rates under privatization or a city-county merger appeared an average 
of six times in ten articles, while negative effects on customers – including rates, fees, 
and foreclosures – appeared about twice as often overall.  
The most active moments of debate and opportunities for management changes 
occurred around each of the three contract reviews in 1996-7, 2002, and 2008: choosing a 
management firm and deciding whether to renew its contract two times. Patterns 
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demonstrated that government response rates increased as coordination of grievances, 
mobilization, and organizing infrastructure increased and leading voices emerged. This 
mobilization crystallized into policy changes when it built upon technical support and 
capacity from advocacy groups and champions both within and outside government. 
Further, the local media played a role, as it reflected the discourse, in also distilling the 
controversies and underscoring and minimizing particular issues. 
 
Results summary and synthesis 
The first round of debates (1996-1999) was distinguished by a focus on keeping 
the quantity and quality of public jobs; the public employees union was the most 
outspoken advocate against a contract at this time. The city’s budget was a driving force 
in the decision to privatize – with either a management firm or the quasi-public county 
authority – and the conclusion that a private contract would save costs was hardly 
disputed in the newspaper coverage. Further advancing a contract, the promise of rate 
decreases was enticing for residents, who as a whole had no prior experience with firm 
management nor a third-party expert imparting contradicting advice. The newspaper’s 
framing generally echoed government arguments and savings estimates, with limited 
other sources of data or analysis. The debate coincided with Mayor Masiello’s election 
cycle, adding a driver for short-term solutions, with less emphasis placed on the long 
term. 
The proposal review process moved quickly in the rush to avoid fiscal setbacks 
and allowed for limited resident engagement. Because the unions were the most vocal 
and organized voice against a private contract, job loss and quality became the leading 
concerns in print and the local paper transmitted the story of a two-sided fight. The most 
common types of direct and indirect quotes in the newspaper, by far, were from city 
officials in favor of privatization and union leaders or workers against it – each appeared 
more than once per article, on average, in the period. Given the limited airspace for a 
given topic and the public’s attraction to dichotomous conflicts, this may have helped to 
keep other players’ grievances out of the limelight at first. The visible nonunion 
detractors to private firm management tended to be regionalism proponents, who saw 
combined city-county water operations as optimal. 
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Very few resident-oriented arguments were made during this period and no right-
to-water or environmental justice language was apparent. A couple of residents referred 
to concerns about a firm’s accountability to the public, but these views were not 
organized or widely disseminated. There were also some predictive concerns on the 
effects of management and rate changes on low-income residents, particularly seniors, 
but these, too, were disconnected and did not carry significant clout or mobilizing 
capacity. That is, the master frame of organizers protesting the privatization proposal was 
a labor rights frame; anti-corporate, accountability, and equity frames were submerged 
and demonstrated far less powerful mobilizing capacity. The result was a process driven 
by government leaders with some input from public unions and, ultimately, a five-year 
water system management contract with American Anglian (soon to become American 
Water and then a subsidiary of Thames and RWE). The unions, while unsuccessful in 
keeping their jobs under public oversight, were able to gain particular stipulations on job 
retention in the final deal. 
During the second phase of debates (2000-2004), regionalism proponents set the 
tone. City cost savings continued to be a primary concern and many government officials 
held that a combined city-county system would help solve the city’s budgetary problems. 
Pushback against this plan centered first on job loss and later on alternative, less 
promising savings calculations. The end of the five-year contract with American Water 
created an opportunity to rehash its terms or consider a competitor; instead, the 
conversation at this time essentially focused on maintaining momentum toward a regional 
agreement. An argument in favor of merging with the county’s water services appeared 
an average of 13 times in every 10 articles during this period. 
Early in the phase, a request from the management firm to extend its contract 
before its expiration had sparked a number of complaints on services and perhaps sped up 
the timing of this feedback. Worker grievances with the contract continued to appear and 
resident complaints started to ramp up. Mandated meter installations and their associated 
costs to homeowners sparked heightened dissatisfaction and brought into the media 
examples of framing related to affordability and rights.  
The water department’s collections tactics became more aggressive, in order to 
increase revenue. Proposal of the steepest rate increase to-date sparked further 
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involvement among residents. Afterward the Water Board recommended a still higher 
rate increase, just as the Common Council was considering its endorsement of a city-
county deal, and some interpreted the move as an attempt to politically force the council 
to approve the regional agreement. By then, an increasing cadre of residents was 
expressing concerns about their ability to access and influence decision makers under the 
next management arrangement. This marked the early formation of a homeowners’/ 
renters’ rights master frame, with which residents and advocates eventually bridged their 
experiences and achieved mobilization results in the third phase, as well as the early 
development of a submerged frame on the right to water and environmental justice. 
The third phase of the management discourse (2004-2008) began after the 
contract renewal. Around this time, American Water Services began to use resident water 
shut-offs and property liens as enforcement tools for payment collections. Resident 
complaints remained frequent, appearing an average of 15 times in 10 articles in this 
period, compared to nearly 17 times in the second period and two times in the first. 
After nearly a decade of the contract, residents had racked up a significant list of 
grievances related to costs and aggressive collections efforts: high and growing rates, 
high late payment fees, mandatory meter installation costs, on-property outdoor repair 
costs, debt transfers to property taxes and property liens, foreclosures, an added fee on 
foreclosure paperwork, unsatisfactory customer service and wait times, water shut-offs, 
and continued water charges after water shut-offs. The Legal Aid Bureau of Buffalo 
became involved through housing cases and contributed mobilization resources and 
infrastructure, as the community-run Community Action Information Center had already 
begun to do. Framing began to bring to light a regressive payment structure of high late 
payment fees, fees to prevent foreclosure, and continued charges on disconnected 
accounts, all of which disproportionately affected those with the tightest finances, 
particularly senior residents. The rate of mentions of low-income and other highly 
affected residents in this period stayed at four times in ten articles, as in the second 
period, having appeared less than once per ten articles during the first. 
The contract’s negative effects on Buffalonians, aided by coverage of these 
effects, became unconscionable for residents (including the neighbors of those most 
extremely affected), their elected officials, and advocates who provided technical 
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assistance and support for mobilization towards policy change. A language change in 
local news articles at this time – which captured the effects on senior and other low-
income residents and referred to equitable and pro-resident rate structures – both reflected 
and likely fueled attitude changes. 
As complaints were escalating into community organizing – and as a contract 
renewal discussion approached – rate hikes subsided and some elected officials began 
echoing the needs that residents had voiced in contract discussions. Residents bridged 
their grievances to a renters’/homeowners’ rights master frame and revealed further 
elements of an equity or environmental justice submerged frame. A collection of 
ingredients contributed to this development. The increased infrastructure and technical 
capacity of local nonprofit organizations, which helped build more frequent and more 
coordinated feedback from residents, was a major factor. At the same time, a greater 
number of Common Council members heard complaints during this period and saw 
addressing them as politically necessary. Alongside resident leaders and advocates, there 
were at least two Council members who were vocal proponents of water policy 
modifications, and the new mayor was also sympathetic to concerns about rising water 
user costs and fees. Finally, evolving media coverage, which included more coverage of 
the negative impacts of privatization on water users and on low-income residents in 
particular, likely contributed to the shift. 
In 2008, a Common Council member championed a Water Ratepayers Bill of 
Rights which included some key policy changes addressing water user complaints – a 
result of organizers’ effective bridging of local experiences to a master frame and 
resident mobilization. The council included the Water Ratepayers Bill of Rights in the 
extension approval. For the first time, one member of the council voted against the 
contract extension – another outcome of community efforts. A shorter contract period of 
two years in this extension increased the firm’s accountability to residents, allowing 
needed time for further scrutiny of its performance and competition with other managing 
companies. Two years later, the city utilized this option and signed onto a new, less 
comprehensive 10-year management contract with a different company, Veolia. 
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Analysis of framing 
Environmental justice and right-to-water (or water justice) values were implicit in 
the Buffalo discourse over time, despite the terms’ virtual absence. Highland Park, 
Michigan residents clearly invoked the environmental justice master frame in response to 
water shut-offs and Milwaukee and Stockton, California residents clearly turned to the 
right-to-water and anti-privatization master frame. In contrast, Buffalo residents relied on 
related but less institutionalized tropes – affordability for low-income communities, 
effects of policies on particular social groups, and accountability to residents. In the years 
leading up to the codified changes in the city’s water management, newspaper articles 
were increasingly referring to residents’ rates, fees, auxiliary costs, water shut-offs, 
foreclosures, and other financial hardships. References to low-income water users, 
particularly senior residents, also rose significantly after the first few years of debate. 
Similarly, few quotations directly referenced neoliberalism’s trademark 
arguments that private markets are universally more efficient and produce better results 
than public services. Mayor Podesto of Stockton was much more direct, for instance, 
when he told an interviewer, “Government departments like this operate as a monopoly, 
basically. They don’t really compete, so really there’s not incentive to improve” (Snitow 
and Kaufman, 2004). Nonetheless, the proponents of private management, whether city-
based or countywide espoused many of the same values as neoliberalism’s most vocal 
international champions. The most commonly cited reason for turning to either 
privatization or regionalization was to save the city costs, with these management 
structures (both private) deemed the most efficient and cost-effective options available. 
Understanding each of these frames in broader terms than their explicit 
proponents use has two primary implications. First, it extends the venues and the terms of 
the global privatization debate to include cases, like that of Buffalo, that rarely arise in 
high-level discussions on policy and practice. These types of cases may not echo 
verbatim the tropes of neoliberal and anti-privatization camps, but they can nonetheless 
play a role in the analysis of trends and inform future decision making. For the water 
justice movement, in particular, an example that shows resident grievances and 
alternative solutions in their own terms – almost completely outside the broader 
movement’s infrastructure or framing – could augment the movement’s case for policy 
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changes. Second, the experiences of low-income residents and residents of color with 
access to drinking water in Buffalo can similarly inform the environmental justice 
movement’s framing. While advocates and academics of environmental justice have 
historically focused on toxins, there is evidence in Buffalonians’ submerged frame that 
the related issues of access to resources and participation in resource management are 
also major concerns to communities. As cases like Highland Park’s, Detroit’s, and 
Buffalo’s arise in response to water management challenges, the framing and 
infrastructure that organizers utilize may extend into the water justice and/or the 
environmental justice spheres. Since these well-established frames carry social and 
political capital, institutional capacity, and other resources with them, this frame bridging 
would likely benefit the future efforts of local movements. 
 
Research shortcomings 
The scope of this research includes the period of 1996 through 2008 and utilizes a 
qualitative historical analysis and a quantitative content analysis to understand the actors, 
frames, and decisions of Buffalo’s water management during this time. To more fully 
understand the policy and budgetary decisions and the movement building processes, one 
could supplement these with quantitative, policy analyses of costs, benefits, and risks and 
ethnographic methodologies. A cost-benefit analysis for Buffalo’s contracting alternative 
to the existing internal evaluations would add information on the financial factors that the 
city both emphasized and omitted in its decision. An ethnographic analysis would better 
capture economic externalities in the evolution of public opinion and policy. 
Further, to better understand the full arc of Buffalo’s water management changes 
over time, one would also examine the period through 2010, when the city decided to 
choose a new water manager and change the terms of the contract. Including this final 
period would likely reveal telling data about addressing the concerns of a private 
management arrangement in designing an improved contract. 
Finally, to draw stronger conclusions about the frames and discursive patterns 
visible in the Buffalo case, a comparative two- or multi-city case study would be a 
valuable piece of complementary research. 
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Policy recommendations 
The case of Buffalo – along with parallel cases in Highland Park, Milwaukee, 
Atlanta, and elsewhere – shows that water is not treated as a basic human right in the 
U.S.; while many communities believe it to be one, this status has not been codified. 
Although potable water may never be free of charge, access to it can be guaranteed 
through social policies and through careful water pricing. Further, if more information 
were available to local governments considering private system management, cities may 
be able to make decisions about whether and how to pursue a contract that better suits 
their inhabitants. Therefore, I recommend the following: 1) that municipalities consider 
equitable rate structure options; 2) that tools are developed for municipalities to weigh 
private and public governance options comprehensively; 3) that municipalities utilize 
these tools as well as third-party experts when considering privatization; and 4) that 
municipalities systematically integrate transparency and accountability both in their 
decision making processes and in the design of their water management policies. 
As the evolution of Buffalo’s water rates and the growing inability of residents to 
afford them shows, rate structures can have significant ramifications on water system 
access – including user access and satisfaction, as well as system revenue. Regressive 
rate structures, such as those with high late fees or disproportionate discounts for 
commercial users, have major repercussions for low-income families. Alternative rate 
structures can lead to far more equitable outcomes, without costing more. Whether a city 
or a firm is setting the rates, leaders can make choices to charge large-quantity residential 
users (who often have big lawns or swimming pools) at higher rates, set low late payment 
fees, and offer multiple options for payment plans. These types of solutions yield results 
that are more fair and less financially burdensome on residents, particularly those who are 
low-income (Gleick, Wolff, Chalecki, and Reyes, 2002; Wolff and Hallstein, 2005). 
Municipal leaders with short-term budget needs often see asset or management 
sales as their only option. They are quick to see future revenue and savings and, 
frequently, do not use comprehensive systems of cost-benefit and risk analysis to weigh 
their decisions. Most city governments’ internal knowledge and expertise for these types 
of negotiations pales in comparison to that of experienced, multinational companies and 
they rarely invest in the appropriate external technical support for their analyses. As a 
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result, elected officials often agree to a partnership for perceived cost savings, without 
sufficient research or information. 
Developing a complete private contract analysis tool that would be readily 
available to mayors and city councils would enable local governments and residents to 
have a complete picture of their options and the pros and cons of each. Such a tool would 
fully encompass the continuing operations costs of overseeing a contract, the alternative 
loan rates available to the municipality, the long-term risks assumed by all parties, and 
the future uncertainties (e.g. climate change) that could affect the decision (see Wolff, 
2003). In addition, it would capture market externalities, in particular, pathways for 
customer feedback and accountability, viewing it as a transferred responsibility of local 
government. Ensuring that technical assistance like this is available to municipal leaders 
would likely lead to altered outcomes in urban water management. 
Finally, Buffalo, Stockton, Highland Park, and Milwaukee residents all made it 
clear that they wanted a voice in water management deliberations. Insertion of systems 
for accountability will go a long way to address dissatisfaction in water management 
tactics. When a private arrangement is up for consideration, cities have the opportunity to 
create avenues for feedback – through transparent processes, town halls, hearings (at 
different times of the day to maintain access for all individuals), and even referenda. In 
public-private contracts, accountability can be achieved by leaving room for evaluation, 
competition, and improvements, via shorter agreement lengths or mid-contract reviews.  
Local, regional, and national governments around the world are struggling with 
the issue of private water management. Whether or not decision makers and community 
members use the terminology and frameworks employed by international movements, 
they are facing the same overarching questions about water management: on access and 
availability, efficiency and costs, ownership and governance. Cities are at the front lines 
of these ideological debates about public water systems and their challenges and lessons 
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